Testimony to the US Senate Subcommittee on Science, Manufacturing, and Competitiveness on “Measuring What Matters: Science, Standards, and Strategic Competition” | Testimonies & Filings | Jul 21, 2026

Contents

Introduction and Summary 1

The Need for Change. 2

Why Technology Production Matters 2

The China Challenge. 3

China’s Innovation Success 4

The Current U.S. Research System. 6

Implications for Federal Policy 7

Conclusion. 15

Endnotes 16

Chairman Budd, Ranking Member Baldwin, and members of the Committee, I’m Robert Atkinson. As the founder, former president, and now a senior fellow of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF)—and beforehand as a undertaking director at the former Congressional Office of Technology Assessment—I’ve centered on science, know-how. and U.S. competitiveness for greater than 35 years.

I commend the Committee in your essential efforts to assess how properly the present U.S. scientific and engineering analysis system matches the new setting of sturdy technological and industrial competitors with China.

Policy often adjustments incrementally, as Congress assesses present efficiency and makes wanted changes. But at varied instances in the historical past of our Republic, coverage has modified in additional basic methods. When it comes to the U.S. science, engineering, and know-how analysis system (“the research system”), now could be the time for such a basic change. We want to abandon the dominant paradigm of investigator-led primary analysis that has been in place since MIT President Vannevar Bush crafted it after World War II. That mannequin labored when the United States was dominant in science and know-how. It not works in a world the place there may be rather more parity—and, specifically, when we have now an aggressive and succesful competitor in the type of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The established order not suffices. It is time for a brand new mannequin.

Before discussing the want for change and the adjustments wanted, it’s helpful to put the challenge in context. A key supply of nationwide wealth and energy comes is the technological sophistication of a rustic’s manufacturing system. Lagging nations principally produce handcrafts or low-skill meeting merchandise. Many middle-income nations have graduated to barely extra complicated manufacturing (e.g., metal and machine manufacturing). But the vanguard of technological energy now comes from extremely complicated and difficult applied sciences. Technologies which might be extraordinarily tough to develop and produce at scale.

Take two examples. The first is semiconductor lithography machines, or machines that make semiconductors. A core part in the machines are mirrors made largely by German agency Carl Zeiss SMT. These mirrors are so exact and clean that the acceptable floor deviation is 50 picometers (50 trillionths of a meter), which is lower than the width of a strand of spider silk. To put that into perspective, a 50-picometer deviation on a mirror that’s 450 millimeters extensive could be simply 0.4 micrometers (0.0004 millimeters) in the event you had been to scale that mirror up to the measurement of the United States.[1] Second, take into account biotechnology, the manufacturing of dwelling cells for some objective, reminiscent of curing illness. A single batch of a biotech drug requires up to 13,000 particular person course of steps and quality-control checks, and the stage of allowable imperfections per dose is the equal of finding one grain of sand hidden inside an Olympic-sized swimming pool.

While not all superior know-how industries require these ranges of sophistication, all of them require complicated data. As science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke wrote: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”[2] Indeed. Just take a look at your mobile phone. It looks like magic.

These sorts of advanced-technology industries rely on many elements for a nation to be globally aggressive in them. One, as I’ll focus on under, is a robust basis of scientific, technical, and engineering data.

A second issue is the means to compete on a stage world taking part in area. Advanced know-how industries are characterised by excessive mounted prices in contrast with marginal prices. That means they need to incur very excessive upfront bills earlier than they’ll even produce the first chip, drug dose, or jet airplane. Economists describe such industries as experiencing growing returns to scale, that means that every further unit bought yields a better fee of revenue as a result of common prices decline.

In these industries, survival relies upon on innovation and scale. And scale, by offering sturdy revenues, allows additional innovation. As such, having the ability to promote to world markets is important. Otherwise, prices received’t fall, and R&D received’t enhance. And opponents will achieve structural benefits that finally can lead to the demise of U.S. corporations. Conversely, U.S. gross sales of superior items and providers usually take market share from Chinese opponents, limiting China’s capability to reinvest and increase. As an instance, if gross sales of China’s COMAC jet airplane had been restricted in the West, then Boeing would have sufficient funds to reinvest in the subsequent era of passenger jets, and COMAC, even with its large authorities subsidies, could be slowed down.

A robust data base and sturdy world gross sales is important for continued U.S. techno-economic energy. It could be one factor if U.S. opponents had been NATO members and different shut allies. While it will not be good for America, it will not be the finish of the world if South Korea took over semiconductors or Airbus took over industrial jets. This is especially true as a result of these allied, democratic, market-based nations typically don’t need to crush the remainder of the competitors, and for the most half they play by the guidelines. This means there would nonetheless be area for American superior know-how exports.

But China adjustments all the pieces. First and foremost, so long as it’s ruled by an avowed Marxist-Leninist social gathering, China might be an adversary intent on dominating superior industries globally.[3] And in contrast to the Soviet Union’s Gosplan-directed economic system, China has embraced simply sufficient capitalism to obtain its aggressive objectives.

What are its objectives? Perhaps the finest evaluation comes from Daniel Tobin, Professor of Practice at the U.S. National Intelligence University. In a May 7, 2025, article titled, “The Persistent, Soaring Ambitions of Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ for China, Socialism, and the Globe,” Tobin analyzed social gathering paperwork, together with Xi Jinping speeches and statements.[4]

He quotes Chinese Leader Xi Jin Ping:

Since 1992, the CCP’s structure has maintained that: “The general starting point and criteria for judging each item of the Party’s work are that it must benefit the development of the socialist productive forces, be conducive to increasing socialist China’s comprehensive national power, and help to improve the people’s living standards.”

The consensus view in Washington is that China simply needs to be sturdy and affluent, simply as any massive growing nation needs to be. But Tobin disagrees:

Indeed, whereas some exterior observers have rushed to level out that the official translation says a worldwide chief not the world chief, it strains credibility that, already seeing itself as the quantity two energy in the world as measured in computations of complete nationwide energy, Beijing’s aim might be to work arduous for a number of a long time solely to stay quantity two. In particular areas of worldwide competitors together with economics, science and know-how, innovation, and navy capabilities, Xi repeatedly talks about “seizing the initiative,” and for and the want for China not to miss one other historic alternative to assume management. Indeed, a 2021 People’s Daily editorial below the pseudonym “Manifesto” (宣言), which Beijing has used a number of instances to specific the ambitions of the new period, maintains that “Gaining the upper hand in the competition of comprehensive national power is the key to national rejuvenation.”[5]

Tobin goes on to argue:

Xi Jinping, from his first days in workplace, has continued to underline these arguments for remaining dedicated to socialism; but he additionally returned to the arguments about socialism’s inevitable worldwide triumph that had not been emphasised since the Mao period.[6]

What is troubling is that almost all U.S. international coverage consultants don’t appear to take Xi severely, assuming that he’s merely mouthing Marxist-Leninist platitudes for the social gathering trustworthy. This could also be partly as a result of they imagine that solely international locations like North Korea and the former Soviet Union are actually Marxists. For them, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is a slogan the CCP proselytizes to pacify the core social gathering members.

However, as former UK diplomat Charles Barton writes:

Internally, when promulgating to its members the speeches of Xi Jinping…social gathering paperwork and directions, the CCP speaks of an ideological battle between programs wherein the People’s Republic of China will achieve domination over the United States. Externally, its international propaganda system derides the notion of a brand new chilly conflict, and speaks of ‘win-win’ or ‘a community with a shared future for mankind.[7]

Finally, as Xi has stated: “Technological innovation has become the main battleground of the global playing field, and competition for tech dominance will grow unprecedentedly fierce.”[8]

Measuring a nation’s innovation success is tough, largely as a result of there are few legitimate and internationally comparable measures of precise innovation. However, three varieties of measures are used: inputs to the innovation course of; outputs from the inputs; and outcomes. On many, science and innovation metrics, if not most, China now leads the United States.

The principal enter measures are R&D spending and manufacturing of STEM expertise.

▪ China’s expenditures on R&D, (PPP costs), was $1.03 trillion in 2024 in contrast to the United States’ $1.01 trillion.[9]

▪ China’s enterprise enterprise expenditure on R&D (PPP present costs), was $799 billion in contrast to the United States’ $782 billion.[10]

▪ China has 3 million full-time equal researchers in 2023 in contrast to the United States’ 1.7 million.[11]

▪ When taking a look at the prime 2,500 companies by way of R&D spending and controlling for researcher prices, U.S. corporations invested simply 13 % greater than Chinese corporations in 2024. However, when excluding biopharmaceuticals and software program, the place the United States is the strongest, Chinese corporations invested 6 % greater than U.S. corporations, with China investing not less than 75 % greater than U.S. companies in industrial engineering, digital and electrical tools, and different power.[12]

The principal output measures are publication counts, patent filings, medical trials listed, and high quality of analysis establishments.

▪ Articles revealed in high-quality natural-science and health-science journals: China had 58,532 articles in contrast to the United States’ 36,860 from March 2025 to February 2026.[13]

▪ Chinese AI publications accounted for 20.6 % of all AI citations in 2024, with the United States at 12.6 %.[14]

▪ In 2024, China accounted for 17.8 % of AI publications globally whereas the United States accounted for simply 7.3 %.[15]

▪ From 2014 to 2025, China’s share of extremely cited researchers globally rose from 4 % to 20 %. The U.S. share declined from 53 % to 37 %.[16]

▪ For the variety of extremely citated AI publications in the prime 100 journals, the United States scored 46 and China 41.[17]

▪ In 2025, there was 3.9 instances extra enterprise capital funding in China than the U.S. (in PPP phrases) and 1.9 instances extra in {dollars}.[18]

▪ According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, “China is no longer merely leading the research in major technology fields. It’s also moving towards a monopolistic position in most of them.”[19]

▪ According the 2026 Nature Index of the prime 25 analysis universities globally, 21 are Chinese and simply three are American. And when scored in accordance to rank (the prime college receives a rating of 25 and the twenty fifth receives a rating of 1), China scores nearly six instances greater than the United States (275 to 47).[20]

▪ China listed 7,100 medical trials in 2024, with 6,000 for the United States. Additionally, 37 % of the licensed molecules produced this yr are projected to come from China.[21]

▪ As of 2022, China produced over 35 % of the publications in top-tier journals, up from almost zero in 1980. The United States’ share fell from 60 % to 25 %. Chinese researchers lead the world in engineering, bodily sciences, and supplies engineering, however haven’t but overtaken the United States in fields reminiscent of biomedical and well being sciences.[22]

▪ The Nature Index of publications in main journals finds that China has 59 % greater than the United States.[23]

▪ For patents filed below the worldwide patent cooperation treaty (PCT), China filed 73,718 purposes in 2025 vs. 52,617 for the United States.[24]

The principal end result measures embrace progress of actual output in superior know-how industries, know-how exports, and productiveness progress.

▪ China holds almost one-quarter of the world market throughout 10 superior industries, and is main manufacturing in 7 of the 10. To match China’s superior {industry} value-added output as a share of GDP, U.S. advanced-industry output would have to develop by $1.5 trillion.[25]

▪ China dominates the electrical car {industry}, the metal {industry}, photo voltaic panels, batteries, telecom tools, chemical substances, uncommon earths, high-speed rail and extra. Leading American corporations like GE Appliances, IBM’s PC enterprise, Lexmark, Motorola Mobility, Magnequench, Cirrus Aircraft and Teledyne Continental Motors, Omni Vision Technologies, and A123 have all been purchased by Chinese corporations.

▪ In different instances, U.S. corporations reminiscent of First Solar, Lucent, Molycorp (uncommon earths), and 3D Robotics have misplaced vital market share or exited the market due to unfair Chinese competitors.

▪ China’s targets going ahead are much more in depth, in client electronics, semiconductors, high-quality chemical substances, machine instruments and robotics, AI, biotechnology and quantum computing. And the danger to main industries in every of fifty states is usually vital.[26]

▪ Of 10 superior industries, China was forward of or on par with the United States in innovation on two (nuclear energy and EVs and batteries), close to the United States on 4 (robotics, quantum computing, AI and shows) and lagging on 4 (semiconductors, chemical substances, biotech, and machine instruments) however making fast progress on three of those. Another information level: the United States runs an annual commerce deficit in superior know-how merchandise with China of $93 billion.[27]

▪ According to the U.S. Census, the United States in 2024 ran a $69 billion commerce deficit with China in superior know-how merchandise.[28]

U.S. science coverage has gone by way of various comparatively distinct phases. After WWII, when science got here to be seen as important to profitable the Cold War and addressing a number of different nationwide challenges, a bipartisan consensus emerged that the federal authorities wanted to increase its funding of science. But it was not clear what the mannequin needs to be. On one aspect was Senator Harley Kilgore (D-WV), who needed a federal science company to advance express nationwide objectives and functions. On the different aspect was scientist Vannevar Bush, who, in his 1945 report to the president, Science: The Endless Frontier, advocated for a scientist-led mannequin with particular person scientists free to pursue their very own pursuits.[29] With the institution of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950, Bush’s imaginative and prescient prevailed. Bush articulated a linear mannequin of innovation, whereby the federal authorities funded primary analysis and then, by way of some unexplained course of, got here industrial improvements. Even although that mannequin has been totally debunked in the science coverage literature, it stays the guiding customary for U.S. analysis coverage.[30]

Bush envisioned 5 key features of this technique:

1. There have to be vital federal funding. By the early Sixties, federal assist for analysis had reached 2 % of GDP.

2. Funding needs to be merit-based, going to the finest universities and researchers, with no focus on geographic variety.

3. There needs to be no strings. As Bush wrote, “Scientific progress on a broad front results from the free play of free intellects, working on subjects of their own choice, in the manner dictated by their curiosity for exploration of the unknown.”[31]

4. All disciplines are equal. If science is to be investigator-led, then authorities shouldn’t favor some disciplines over others. The main aim is data era. And all fields are equally able to producing data. Astronomy is as helpful as laptop science.

5. Science needs to be world. Bush wrote that “the Government should take an active role in promoting the international flow of scientific information.”[32] The development of science advantages humanity, so worldwide collaboration is valued even when the United States is a web exporter of scientific data.

The United States may afford this mannequin as a result of we dominated each scientific analysis and manufacturing. It wasn’t even shut. And so, the present science system was established and stays embedded, whilst the United States lags dramatically behind world leaders in manufacturing, particularly China, and it’s struggling to maintain tempo with China in science.

While science was to be “pure,” there was additionally a realization that science and engineering performed key roles in supporting key nationwide missions. Indeed, the dictates of the Cold War meant that sure disciplines, particularly physics, engineering, and later laptop science, had been privileged. This included protection, area, well being, agriculture, and power. These had been seen as acceptable areas for presidency assist for not simply early stage analysis but additionally later-stage improvement as a result of they had been areas the personal sector would underinvest in. But in contrast to most U.S. opponents, together with China, nationwide competitiveness was by no means a mission. That was up to the personal sector alone.

The United States has by no means earlier than confronted a techno-economic problem prefer it does now with China. The Soviets had been a navy adversary, however not a techno-economic adversary. China is each. As such, it’s time to reconceive and considerably reform the U.S. analysis system.

These adjustments in the world setting counsel various adjustments are wanted in federal analysis coverage.

While the focus of this listening to is on measurement and accountability, it’s price noting that federal assist for R&D has fallen as a share of GDP. It was 1.86 % of GDP throughout the peak of the Cold War and has fallen to round 0.62 %. With funding scarce, one choice is to tie any new will increase particularly to utilized R&D in what ITIF calls “national economic power industries.”[33]

Some argue that we don’t want extra federal funding in analysis as a result of the personal sector will merely fill in the hole. But scholarly analysis has disproved that concept. Federal funding of science shouldn’t be an alternative choice to personal sector analysis; it’s a complement.[34] After reviewing over 60 educational articles on whether or not public sector R&D crowds out private-sector investments, Cockburn and Henderson concluded:

There are various econometric research that, whereas imperfect and undoubtedly topic to enchancment and revision, between them make a fairly convincing case for a excessive fee of return to public science on this [life-sciences] {industry}. It is price noting that there are, as far as we’re conscious, no systematic quantitative research which have discovered a unfavorable impression of public science.[35]

One means to differentiate between insurance policies and packages is on the foundation of what economists name spatial externalities. In different phrases, home insurance policies can have results past the border, both serving to or hurting different nations. Some actions, reminiscent of primary analysis, spill over and assist different nations. Scholarly analysis reveals that when a rustic, even one as massive as the United States, funds primary analysis, the majority of the advantages “spill over” to different nations, and they’ll use that data to assist their very own economies.[36] In distinction, a bigger share of the advantages of utilized R&D are retained in the nation.

Given this, the rational factor for any nation wishing to maximize its welfare is to make investments extra in utilized analysis whereas relying on others for primary analysis outcomes. That is what most international locations aside from the United States do. They basically free journey ‘on U.S. investment in basic research.

Related to this, other countries target economic competitiveness much more in their R&D funding. According to an OECD study, the United States ranks 34th in out of 36 nations in the share of total federal R&D invested in industrial production and technology.[37]

For too long, the United States has been doing the responsible thing, and other nations have been doing the “selfish” thing. The United States has long invested significant funds into basic research through agencies like NSF, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Department of Energy (DOE). In contrast, nations like China, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan devote a significantly larger share of their R&D budgets to applied research to benefit their domestic industries.[38]

For example, most of China’s analysis is later-stage analysis designed to give its corporations benefit. China is aware of that it could actually free journey off U.S.-funded primary analysis. Chinese researchers attend worldwide conferences to hear U.S. researchers current their findings. They subscribe to all the scientific journals that publish outcomes of NSF recipients’ work. They ship their graduate college students and put up docs to U.S. universities.[39]

The science funding system is agnostic about the problem of nationwide advanced-industry competitiveness. But it not is smart to deal with all scientific disciplines the identical.

This differentiation was the tenet behind the CHIPS and Science Act when it recognized 10 key applied sciences that the authorities ought to make investments extra in. This was a very good step, however the effort is underfunded and managed in the NSF TIP program, the place it did little to reorient NSF analysis directorates.

Prioritization might be strongly resisted by the science institution as they circle the wagons to defend the present system. But these protests needs to be ignored. For instance, the Trump administration’s proposal to eradicate the NSF Directorate for Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences (SBE) has been broadly criticized, but it surely is smart so long as the financial savings are redirected to different key directorates, reminiscent of Engineering, Biological Sciences, Computer and Information Science and Engineering, and the Directorate for Technology, Innovation and Partnership.[40]

In addition, federal coverage ought to give engineering analysis a bigger share of assist. Engineering analysis is important to world competitiveness. But solely about 15 % of federal analysis funding goes to engineering. This needs to be doubled to not less than 30 %.[41]

At the identical time, new funding needs to be focused to areas of science, engineering, and know-how which have direct implications for nationwide financial energy industries.

Finally, NSF and different federal businesses want to take rather more severely the nationwide competitiveness part in “Broader Impact Assessments” in award assessment. In 2011, in accordance to the NSF National Science Board, simply 17 % of proposals and reviewers thought of competitiveness as an impression, whereas 45 % thought of elevated participation of girls and underrepresented minorities as one.[42] The board discovered:

Across the 4 questions, the most typical objectives and actions had been inclusion of girls and underrepresented teams; training and coaching; and public outreach. Pre-K12 centered actions and societal advantages had been in the second tier, U.S. competitiveness and partnerships in the third tier, and nationwide safety was lowest, with solely 4 mentions throughout all the responses to the first 4 questions.

When scientists had been requested which matters needs to be added going ahead, the most typical one was “social welfare and human health.” In different phrases, competitiveness is window dressing established in the Eighties, when Japan was the foremost problem, however shouldn’t be actually thought of as we speak.

The science institution needs to measure success by how a lot funding it will get, or at finest by articles in peer-reviewed science journals. This is okay solely if you would like a system with no actual accountability.

As such, federal science businesses want to undertake and use higher metrics of success. These might be, for instance, measures of switch of discoveries to the industrial market, as the Association of University Technology Managers publishes yearly.[43]

A key measure needs to be {industry} funding of college analysis. It is troubling that the fee of {industry} funding varies so dramatically. For states, North Carolina, Georgia, and Kansas led in the share of college analysis funded by {industry}, and Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Nevada had been final. Among establishments, Duke, MIT, and Ohio State led, whereas University of Maryland, Michigan State, and Pitt had been final.[44]

Having sturdy {industry} funding pays off economically. There are small, however constructive correlations between the share of a state’s college analysis supported by {industry} and its energy in key innovation variables reminiscent of high-tech startups (an R-value of 0.15), enterprise capital (0.28), high-tech jobs (0.14), and scientists and engineers (0.19).[45] Industry analysis funding can be related to stronger college know-how output, with a correlation of 0.26 between {industry} share and educational patents.[46] Moreover, interplay with {industry} as a STEM graduate scholar is related to considerably better chance of manufacturing mental property (e.g., patents, invention disclosure, and so forth.).[47]

As such, Congress ought to make various adjustments. It ought to require packages like NSF’s Engineering Research Center program to have not less than some matching funds from {industry} as a situation of being awarded funding. Congress ought to increase the R&D credit score for corporations that fund college analysis and eradicate language that restricts the definition of primary analysis to tasks “not having a specific commercial objective.”[48] It ought to broaden the tax credit score for power analysis consortia to embrace all analysis consortia. Finally, it ought to make all enterprise funding of college and federal lab analysis eligible for a 40 % flat tax credit score. One benefit of those extra market-based approaches is that they let {industry} have extra of a say in the sorts of analysis that’s funded, and they higher align academia to real-world points and issues.

Federal funding businesses ought to tie a small portion of whole greater training funding to how properly particular person universities do at acquiring {industry} funding for R&D, as another nations have completed. The UK’s Research Excellence Framework contains an “impact” part that assesses industrial and societal impression of analysis, together with patents, spinouts, and {industry} partnerships. Australia’s engagement and impression evaluation system scores universities on {industry} engagement, earnings from {industry}, and impression case research. Chinese college funding and researcher analysis more and more weight patents, know-how switch, and enterprise partnerships.

Finally, we want to enhance the significance of commercialization actions at federal labs and analysis institutes. America’s federal laboratories are insufficiently incentivized to make investments time, power, and sources in facilitating know-how switch. DOE lab planning steering features a devoted “Technology Transitions, Commercialization, and Partnership Strategy” part asking labs to describe their CRADA, ACT, and Strategic Partnerships Projects actions and how these tie into lab technique. But that’s a planning-narrative requirement, not a scored efficiency criterion on par with the eight objectives. It wants to be an enforced efficiency requirement tied to funding.

The China problem is so massive (if half as a result of China has an enormous inhabitants) that the United States cannot hope for fulfillment if it doesn’t associate with allies. As such, Congress and federal businesses want to work to increase joint analysis initiatives with allies. These actions may embrace partnering in areas like robotics and aerospace, AI use, and growing a shared community of advanced-industry facilities wherein corporations from each international locations can take part in one another’s packages, and joint participation in nationwide science packages. A rustic may qualify for formal participation if it 1) takes steps related to the United States in limiting data switch to the PRC, and 2) gives an applicable share of funding.

The U.S. system sees science as a worldwide good, not a weapon in a techno-economic conflict and so it’s lax on limiting PRC entry to U.S. technological data. Any new system ought to work to restrict the means of China to entry U.S. data and capabilities. As ITIF has documented, there are a variety of steps Congress and the administration ought to take to restrict scientific and technical cooperation with China.[49]

University and Government Research Policies

The framework by which U.S. and Western universities typically govern themselves not works. During the Cold War, it was broadly accepted that universities ought to work to restrict data switch to the Soviets. University insurance policies had been considerably adjusted to align with nationwide safety priorities, spurred by federal funding and public nervousness.

But with the fall of the Soviet Union, universities and even authorities analysis laboratories embraced a globalist imaginative and prescient of information. In this imaginative and prescient, science is a worldwide good. More collaboration is best. And universities, particularly personal ones, owe little allegiance to the nation, and a lot to the world as an entire. This is very true after the declines in federal and state authorities assist to universities, with most universities now, like most corporations, looking first and foremost for his or her backside strains, and not the assist of U.S. nationwide techno-economic energy.

At the identical time, schools and universities are determined for income, even when that comes from Chinese college students, corporations, or the CCP. As such, the most essential change that wants to occur is for widespread acceptance by U.S. universities that China is an adversary, not a buyer. Because of sturdy incentives for universities to pursue their very own self-interest quite than nationwide curiosity, the federal authorities will want to play a stronger function. There are many steps it wants to take.

Congress may begin by limiting Chinese nationals from acquiring postdocs at universities and federally funded analysis and improvement facilities (FFRDCs). Many Chinese nationals acquiring postdoctoral positions in the United States achieve this after graduating from a U.S. college. And traditionally, a excessive share has stayed in America, contributing to the U.S. innovation base and not contributing to China’s. But some Chinese nationals come to examine as postdocs after graduating in China. Many of them return to China, and the United States doesn’t profit. In truth, key data these college students purchase in the United States is now utilized in China.

While NSF doesn’t gather information on the nationality of postdocs, many are from different nations. For instance, 55 % of postdocs at federally funded R&D facilities are non permanent visa holders.[50] Universities and FFRDCs needs to be required to report the nation of citizenship of postdocs, and the authorities ought to monitor their later choices to decide whether or not they stayed in the United States or went again to house international locations, particularly China. At the identical time, the place universities and FFRDCs are usually not ready to rent Americans, they need to attempt to rent postdocs from allied nations or non-adversary nations reminiscent of India, and not from China.

Congress ought to ban Chinese funding of U.S. analysis universities. While China has proved that it could actually innovate, it usually depends on U.S. mental property (IP) and analysis to advance its personal nationwide know-how improvements. One means it does that is by funding U.S. college analysis. Chinese-funded analysis performed in the United States is taken again to China, hurting U.S. competitiveness. There is proof that the CCP funds American universities to advance its agenda—and at present there isn’t any sturdy authorized device to compel recipients to disclose their funding sources.[51]

Congress ought to make federal funding of college analysis contingent on universities not receiving Chinese funding for analysis.[52] And this ban also needs to prolong to pass-throughs the place China funds a U.S. entity that then funds the U.S. analysis establishment.[53] As such, Congress ought to move the Defending Education Transparency and Ending Rogue Regimes Engaging in Nefarious Transactions (DETERRENT) Act to increase the oversight and disclosure necessities concerning Chinese funds channeled to U.S. universities and analysis establishments.

The DETERRENT Act would shut loopholes in insufficient reporting and enforcement of federal legal guidelines on college disclosures concerning presents and contracts from international entities.[54] This invoice proposes reducing the reporting threshold to $50,000. The DETERRENT Act additionally would prohibit universities from coming into into contracts with a international nation of concern or with a international entity of concern with out acquiring a waiver and would maintain personal analysis establishments accountable for his or her monetary partnerships by requiring disclosure of regarding international investments of their endowments.[55]

Congress also needs to require disclosure of U.S. college analysis with Chinese researchers associated to nationwide energy industries. ITIF has reported that PRC espionage is a technique that extends from state intelligence businesses to nominally personal corporations, and that Beijing coordinates cyber, human, and company channels to steal U.S. industrial and protection applied sciences.[56] The PRC’s espionage ecosystem is aided by the U.S. analysis setting, which privileges the free circulation of concepts and researchers, permitting China to recruit (or coerce) expertise skilled in America and to have a few of this expertise have interaction in IP theft and know-how switch.

A 2024 report from the House Select Committee on the CCP reveals that Georgia Tech obtained $17 million from an entity affiliated with Tianjin University, whereas UC Berkeley obtained almost $22 million from entities affiliated with Tsinghua University.[57] These contracts had been found years after they had been in place, and each contain superior analysis on dual-use applied sciences. The failure to report is due to weak enforcement of Section 117 of the Higher Education Act. This part requires the disclosure of presents and contracts over $250,000 from international entities. However, the auditing is proscribed to the Department of Education, and it’s doable to obscure the true sources of funding by bypassing funds by way of intermediaries.[58]

At minimal, universities needs to be required to disclose in actual time all analysis partnerships with researchers or corporations in China. Where these partnerships are with entities of concern in China, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy establishments, or affiliated establishments (e.g., the “seven sons of national defense”), the researchers needs to be required to first get permission from NSF.

Congress also needs to approve the Securing American Funding and Expertise from Adversarial Research Exploitation Act of 2025 (SAFE Act) to block U.S. federal grants to scientists with a historical past of collaborating with hostile international international locations, reminiscent of China. This invoice is drafted in response to a House China Select Committee report that identifies over 50 partnerships between U.S. universities and entities related to the CCP, together with joint diploma packages with China’s Seven Sons of National Defense—a gaggle of Chinese universities chosen to focus on navy and protection analysis and analysis on delicate, dual-use applied sciences reminiscent of submarine engineering, plane energy engineering, and mechanical design, manufacturing, and automation.[59] The SAFE Act would ban federally funded science, know-how, engineering, and arithmetic (STEM) analysis by researchers with a historical past of collaborating with PRC-associated entities, ban DOD funding for universities that associate with adversaries, and, related to the DETERRENT Act, impose stricter disclosure necessities on collaboration with entities related to adversaries.[60]

In addition, a 2023 Select Committee on the CCP report outlines additional suggestions to “strengthen U.S. research security and defend against malign talent recruitment.”[61] Among its suggestions, the report suggests bettering cross-agency disclosure steering produced below National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33) by NSF. This would require all recipients of federal analysis funding, together with their personnel and subcontractors, to disclose their relationships with entities and pursuits with international adversaries for a sure interval (e.g., the previous 5 years). In addition, the Select Committee, to assist businesses in the vetting course of, has proposed the creation of “an unclassified database using open-source information to keep track of PRC research entities that engage in defense and military research and civil-military fusion programs.”[62] Congress ought to ban cooperation with CCP/PLA-associated entities and there needs to be a presumption of analysis being problematic, and establishments needs to be required to acquire waivers to proceed.

The National Science Foundation lately introduced new steering for universities on working with events on the number of U.S. entities record, prohibiting such partnerships.[63] This is welcome, however frankly a decade overdue. But it doesn’t go far sufficient. It is smart that the PLA-affiliated universities are on an entity record, however what about Tsinghua University and Peking University which aren’t?

This will get to a key problem in the entity record system: The itemizing mechanism is transaction-evidentiary, not capability-based. BIS additions below Part 744 require “reasonable cause to believe, based on specific and articulable facts” tied to a documented exercise—a selected procurement, a selected lab’s involvement in a selected weapons or AI program, a selected export violation. But that is nonetheless a legacy of the previous system tied to WMD and navy capabilities, not broad-based technological competitors, and particular instances, not general establishments. As such, NSF ought to go additional and require universities to obtain approval for any analysis with Chinese universities that’s associated to dual-use applied sciences.

Institute Better Screening of Chinese STEM Students

There are vastly extra Chinese college students finding out in the United States than U.S. college students finding out in China. On the one hand, they achieve data right here that they’ll use in the event that they return. On the different hand, in the event that they keep in the United States (and don’t switch data to China), they’re a web plus for the U.S. innovation ecosystem, and conversely, their presence weakens China by decreasing expertise ranges in China. Even in the event that they return to China, they’ve been uncovered to the U.S. system of freedom and democracy and maybe would need to assist that in China sooner or later in the future.

However, there are two challenges. The first is that some college students return to China. But that doesn’t imply we must always reduce off flows. If they didn’t come to the United States, they might seemingly go to different nations with sturdy greater training programs, and U.S. analysis college competitiveness would decline. Moreover, the fee of staying for Chinese STEM college students stays fairly excessive. One examine finds that, of a pattern of 100 Chinese AI researchers finding out in the United States in 2019, 87 % remained in the United States in 2025.[64] However, that is nonetheless a comparatively restricted time interval, and we don’t know what number of plan to return in the subsequent decade. One 2024 examine of Chinese college students enrolled in U.S. greater ed discovered that solely 43 % intend to keep in the United States.[65]

At the identical time, there’s a share of Chinese college students who’re “bad apples.” They strain fellow Chinese college students to toe the CCP social gathering line. They steal U.S. IP. They are intently tied to the Chinese navy or intelligence providers.[66] Indeed, the porousness between Chinese educational establishments and the PRC authorities has confirmed to be an ongoing drawback. The United States in 2025 introduced that it will begin revoking visas of Chinese college students with connections to the CCP or finding out in important fields. This needs to be expanded. Multiple instances have highlighted particular Chinese faculties whose college students have been linked to the theft of commerce secrets and techniques and proprietary info. The United States ought to blacklist these Chinese establishments and reject their college students’ visa purposes.

What is the ratio of “bad apples” to “good”? Is it altering? We have no idea. But this shouldn’t be a binary alternative between limiting or banning Chinese college students and opening the doorways to all with no evaluation. Universities and FFRDCs want to do extra due diligence on Chinese STEM college students coming right here, particularly for graduate packages. They want to higher monitor for dangers of IP theft. The federal authorities ought to require universities to be extra clear: How many Chinese are enrolled in what disciplines? And it wants to present analytical instruments to universities and FFRDCs to make higher choices on particular person college students.

One of the the explanation why universities are so opposed to any limits on Chinese college students is that many rely on them as a supply of tuition income and low-wage analysis help. Given the cuts in state and federal funding for universities, that is comprehensible. But all else equal, universities and associated packages ought to attempt to recruit college students from different nations, reminiscent of India. Related to this, the U.S. authorities ought to strain international fellowship and different tuition help packages to not embrace Chinese college students and as an alternative prioritize college students from different nations.

Restrict the U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement

President Jimmy Carter mistakenly furthered opening up to China in 1979, and one step was to signal the U.S.-China Science and Technology (S&T) Agreement. The concept was that by sharing science and know-how, China would transfer into the U.S. orbit and relations would turn into friendlier. Like a lot of U.S. coverage towards China over the final 50 years, it was based mostly on wishful pondering and naïveté. China didn’t need to turn into like us. It needed entry to our science and know-how to advance its nationwide energy.

Over the years, the S&T settlement—a course of whereby federal businesses have interaction in partnerships with Chinese businesses and scientists—has led to Chinese advances in nationwide energy industries. As a 2014 report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission notes:

In distinction to the U.S. method of using S&T cooperation primarily as a device of diplomacy, China makes use of S&T engagement as a part of a nationwide technique to construct scientific capabilities. This has enabled the fast improvement of China’s S&T capabilities and threatens the United States’ standing as the world’s main scientific energy. The report additionally identifies some nationwide safety challenges, together with the switch of delicate know-how by way of espionage and different implies that have emerged in the context of bilateral S&T cooperation.[67]

Indeed, proponents of the settlement—who’re additionally proponents of engagement with the PRC—level to cooperation on issues reminiscent of influenza (which clearly didn’t work out properly, given the indisputable fact that China was the supply of COVID), start defects, and air air pollution. But they don’t point out tasks on EVs, agricultural biotechnology, human biotechnology, and nanotechnology, or assist with know-how requirements (which China now manipulates).

When the settlement was final up for renewal, the Biden administration negotiated sure adjustments, however these had nothing to do with stopping switch of key data to China.[68] To make certain, there could also be areas the place cooperation is reciprocal and doesn’t lead to advances in key know-how areas supporting Chinese nationwide energy industries. As such, the Trump administration shouldn’t cancel the settlement. But it ought to change the settlement to restrict it to areas that don’t present China with any help in applied sciences associated to nationwide financial energy industries. Endangered species analysis sharing, sure. EV analysis sharing, no.

The world has essentially modified in the final decade. The utopian imaginative and prescient of worldwide built-in, democratic, free-market economies working collectively in concord has not materialized. The perception that China couldn’t innovate has proved to be false. And the perception that the United States would proceed to lead in advanced-technology innovation and manufacturing has additionally confirmed to be false.

These new realities require daring reforms in the U.S. analysis system. Opponents, particularly defenders of the college analysis system, will argue that it’s the unfettered pursuit of information that drives innovation and even nationwide competitiveness. They will argue that authorities can’t decide winners. They will argue that each one disciplines needs to be handled equally. That might have made sense in the previous. It not does.

And they may argue that science might be politicized based mostly on who’s in the White House.[69] Indeed, they body OMB proposals in the Trump administration as “an attack on American science” and declare that the White House will “destroy science.”[70] If something will “destroy” science, will probably be decreased federal funding, coupled with Chinese destruction of U.S. science-based industries.

It can be essential to acknowledge that science has already been politicized; the Biden administration sought to use science to advance its DEI objectives. And the concept that the science neighborhood has not politicized itself shouldn’t be borne out by the proof.[71] A Nature journal editorial said that “The enterprise of science has been—and remains—complicit in systemic racism.”[72] And main science and tech coverage journals, together with Issues in Science and Technology and the MIT Technology Review have taken a flip to the progressive left lately.[73]

Meanwhile, the science neighborhood is stunned that there’s a response—maybe an overreaction—by the Trump administration to this politization of science. Similarly, given the long-standing disregard of the U.S. educational neighborhood working with adversaries, together with China, is it any shock that OMB’s proposed rule takes a strict method to limiting cooperation with adversaries?[74] Indeed, the failure of the science neighborhood to adequately police itself on issues of each DEI and working with China, not surprisingly has produced stringent rules in response.

The actuality is that neither Democratic nor Republican administrations ought to politicize science by way of imposing their ideological views on the enterprise. But earlier than that may occur, the U.S. science enterprise can have to take a tough take a look at itself and return to objectivity. Even if it does so, which appears unlikely, shifting the science institution to focus on areas important to competing with China shouldn’t be politization of science, except the science neighborhood believes that politization is when democratically elected representatives have priorities for what sort of science taxpayer-funded scientists conduct. The unhappy actuality is that that is precisely what the science neighborhood believes.

Thank you in your consideration.