Iran's Security Forces Shape Minds of Young Cadets Through Indoctrination

Iran's security forces have a significant impact on young cadets who join their ranks, shaping their minds through rigorous training and indoctrination.

Cadets at Iran's academy are constantly under the regime's control, from military training to daily prayers and speeches. This intense indoctrination is designed to instill loyalty and devotion to the Islamic Republic.

Some recruits rise through the ranks to become part of an elite group of officers who plan missions, abductions, and assassinations inside and outside Iran. These officers have access to unlimited resources and personnel, making them a powerful force within the regime.

A senior commander in Iran's special forces recently contacted DW with information about the inner workings of the country's security apparatus. However, there were concerns that he might be trying to feed misinformation or harm the broadcaster.

Months of correspondence between the commander, known as Omid, and DW journalists provided a wealth of information about his training and activities within the regime.

Omid shared records and photos of his training, which included courses on sniper practice, surveillance, street fighting, riot control, and parachuting. He also revealed details about a secret monitoring center and housing compounds reserved for high-ranking members of Iran's security forces.

The commander's testimony offered a unique insight into the lives of those at the core of the Islamic Republic, highlighting their absolute loyalty to the supreme leader and their role in plotting missions against regime opponents.

Documents obtained by our investigative team confirm that Iran's elite forces have a significant influence on the lives of young cadets.

The regime's control extends far beyond the battlefield, with officers enjoying privileges such as financial incentives and lucrative economic contracts for their own businesses.

These perks come with a price: complete control over every aspect of an officer's life. They are tightly monitored, with even personal travel plans subject to approval from higher authorities.

Officers' passports can be confiscated at any time, and they may not even be allowed to attend family weddings or other social events without permission.

The regime also exercises control over soldiers' personal relationships, vetting their prospective partners before allowing them to marry.

Even then, officers are often forced to keep the true nature of their work a secret from their loved ones, leading to significant emotional strain and isolation.

By separating these agents from regular Iranians, the regime can maintain a closer eye on its forces and exert greater influence over their lives, said Saeid Golkar, a political scientist at the University of Tennessee.

The Iranian regime's security forces are often segregated from regular Iranians, which can lead to a lack of empathy towards civilians.

This segregation makes it more likely for security personnel to carry out brutal actions against their own people without hesitation.

A high-ranking defector, who wishes to remain anonymous, shared his story with DW. He worked in the Information Ministry, which is closely linked to Iran's intelligence agency.

The defector, referred to as Reza, comes from a devout family and initially supported the regime. He even wore the traditional long beard and turban favored by many Iranians.

Reza's relatives still hold prominent positions within the Iranian government, but he began to question the regime's actions after witnessing the crackdown on protesters.

The guilt of having served a cruel system for over a decade weighed heavily on Reza's conscience, prompting him to speak out despite the risks to himself and his family. He acknowledged witnessing the killing of demonstrators during his time in service.

Revealing the inner workings of Iran's elite forces, Omid and Reza discussed secret command centers that play a crucial role in suppressing protests. These high-tech facilities are equipped with state-of-the-art surveillance systems, featuring large monitors displaying real-time feeds from thousands of CCTV cameras across Tehran.

The monitoring rooms, located throughout the country, also track protest marches from above using drones. According to Reza, a vast array of information is collected and analyzed in these command centers, including data from social media platforms like Twitter and Telegram, as well as intelligence gathered through surveillance devices.

Infiltration is another tactic employed by Iran's elite forces. Omid revealed that plainclothes agents often blend into protest groups, redirecting marches to areas where security forces are waiting in ambush.

From within the command center, a representative of Iran's supreme leader has significant authority, with the power to order operations and decide on the level of force used against protesters. This raises serious concerns about the regime's willingness to use excessive violence to quell dissent.

When regular police are unable to contain demonstrations, elite units from the Revolutionary Guard and police are deployed to restore order. These units, clad in black balaclavas to conceal their identities, are often equipped with heavy machine guns mounted on pickup trucks.

Human rights organizations have documented the use of automatic and semiautomatic machine guns, as well as heavy machine guns, to suppress protests in Iran.

Security forces in Iran are equipped with military-grade firearms that were designed for combat situations, raising concerns about the country's handling of protests.

The use of such weapons to suppress dissent is a worrying trend that has been documented by human rights organizations, which have accused the authorities of using excessive force against protesters.

A recent report by Amnesty International analyzed the regime's chain of command during the 2022 protests following the death of Jina Mahsa Amini in custody. The findings suggest that the killings of protesters are intentional and not just a result of overzealous policing.

In a separate investigation, an informant pointed to a location on the outskirts of Tehran as a key hub for off-the-books operations by Iran's elite forces. The location is a prayer hall named Beit al Shohada, or the house of martyrs, which is situated between an occupational therapy practice and a pharmacy.

The prayer hall, also known as Dakhme, is said to be where high-ranking officers meet to plot operations that bypass government structures. These meetings allegedly involve decisions about murder, making Dakhme a hub for what one informant described as a "killing machine.

Several experts were aware of Dakhme in connection with a past attempt on the life of an adviser to a reformist president over two decades ago. However, no one could confirm its continued operation or verify claims that it is still used to plan murders and abductions.

The existence of such a facility is plausible, according to Miad Maleki, a former US Treasury official who designed sanctions programs targeting Iran. He believes the regime feels the need for groups like Dakhme more than ever, but the exact nature and extent of their activities remain unclear.

The secretive nature of Dakhme has made it difficult to verify many claims about its activities. However, based on accounts from Omid and rare images obtained by DW, it appears that covert military operations are planned within the facility. These operations would likely provide the regime with plausible deniability in cases where individuals are killed.

Inside Dakhme, secret meetings often masquerade as religious ceremonies and rituals, typically taking place in a large hall adorned with green drapes and religious banners. After a communal dinner, only those deemed part of the inner circle remain, while others leave their mobile phones behind to be locked away. This suggests that sensitive discussions may take place during these gatherings.

According to Omid, seasoned specialists" from Iran's special forces and intelligence operation discuss matters such as murder and abductions late into the night. These individuals seem to prioritize loyalty above personal position or status, taking swift action against anyone deemed a threat to the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.

After each operation, these men return to their respective roles within Iran's security apparatus, only to reconvene when necessary to defend the regime at all costs. This cycle underscores the pervasive influence of Dakhme in shaping the actions and loyalties of its operatives.