The Trump administration has tentatively agreed to permit Saudi Arabia to counterpoint uranium with out enacting worldwide safeguards supposed to forestall nuclear weapons growth, in line with sources acquainted with the matter and paperwork reviewed by NCS.
The draft nuclear accord that outlines US help for Riyadh’s civilian nuclear program is awaiting President Donald Trump’s signature regardless of US-Saudi negotiations concluding in October 2025.
Two sources acquainted with the matter indicated that the continuing warfare with Iran — which in line with Trump was launched in half to forestall Tehran from utilizing its enriched uranium to construct nuclear weapons — has performed a job in delaying Trump’s signature. Some on Capitol Hill additionally consider the Trump administration is delaying sign-off as a result of it may face a bipartisan disapproval decision blocking the offers from going into impact, mentioned one of many sources.
Experts informed NCS the deal may probably present Saudi Arabia with a path to nuclear weapons until stringent safeguards are put in place. The nation’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has beforehand threatened to construct his personal nuclear weapons should Iran, his country’s principal regional rival, acquire the bomb.
Four sources mentioned the settlement, which features a civil nuclear cooperation deal referred to as a 123 settlement and a compulsory nuclear safeguards settlement, nonetheless haven’t been despatched to Congress for evaluation, as federal legislation requires the White House to do as soon as signed.
The White House didn’t reply questions concerning the agreements and as an alternative referred NCS to an October 2025 statement from Energy Secretary Chris Wright saying the top of negotiations.
“We’ve come together on a deal for civil nuclear cooperation,” Wright mentioned on the time. “Together, with bilateral safeguard agreements, we want to grow our partnership, bring American nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia and keep a firm commitment to nonproliferation.”
The Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC didn’t reply to a request for remark.
The Trump administration briefed some on Capitol Hill on the fundamental outlines of the Saudi nuclear accords earlier this 12 months and even then, it was previewed as having a particular association permitting for a level of home uranium enrichment and/or plutonium reprocessing, in line with a supply acquainted with the matter. The supply mentioned that would be “unprecedented” for such a deal.
The uranium enrichment provision contains stipulations imposed by the US, two sources informed NCS, however particulars of potential limitations are unclear.
The 123 settlement additionally won’t present the ultimate phrase on whether or not Saudi Arabia will get delicate expertise and materials.
The settlement is a baseline authorized framework for US corporations (or the federal government) to switch nuclear materials and expertise to the recipient nation’s civilian nuclear program. Those transfers are topic to extra evaluation.
Uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing are the 2 important pathways to create the core materials obligatory to construct nuclear weapons. Most international locations whose civilian nuclear reactors require enriched uranium don’t produce it domestically — they as an alternative buy the fabric from distributors just like the US or Russia and obtain it in sealed shipments underneath strict worldwide supervision.
But the draft settlement additionally doesn’t require Saudi Arabia to undertake a regular enhanced nuclear safeguards settlement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, referred to as the Additional Protocol, in line with a waiver submitted to Congress final 12 months by the administration and a May State Department letter to lawmakers, each reviewed by NCS. Instead, the safeguards deal will likely be solely between the US and the dominion.
The IAEA is the UN’s nuclear watchdog company, charged with stopping rogue nuclear weapons growth by verifying international locations’ commitments underneath the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT. The company does so by way of strategies resembling monitoring expertise, in-person inspections, and open-source evaluation.
The administration, in its 2025 waiver report back to Congress, mentioned that the draft bilateral US-Saudi safeguards settlement “employs additional safeguards and verifications measures to the most proliferation-sensitive areas … enrichment, conversion, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing.” Without offering particular particulars, the waiver report mentioned the IAEA would play a job in safeguarding the Saudi nuclear program and asserted that “the IAEA would have the necessary tools” for his or her work however would not have standardized IAEA oversight by way of the Additional Protocol.
Both the enrichment and reprocessing potential and the shortage of enhanced IAEA dedication instantly raised issues amongst many members on Capitol Hill, in line with a supply acquainted. The Saudi deal stands in distinction to the 2009 settlement between the US and the United Arab Emirates, whereby the UAE agreed to the improved IAEA oversight and promised to forego enrichment and reprocessing. Nuclear consultants seek advice from the UAE deal because the “gold standard” for nuclear cooperation.
“The Additional Protocol was explicitly designed to give the IAEA more access after it became clear that (basic) comprehensive safeguards agreements were insufficient” to forestall international locations from progressing in the direction of nuclear weapons, mentioned Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association.
Andrea Stricker, deputy director of nonproliferation work on the Foundation for Defense of Democracies suppose tank, informed NCS that now shouldn’t be the second to attract new requirements.
“If you don’t have the Additional Protocol in place, then the IAEA would have fewer rights to go to (inspect suspected) undeclared sites,” mentioned Stricker. “I think with rolling back the Iran enrichment problem, this is a prime opportunity to double down on the gold standard.”
Dan Joyner, a nuclear regulatory guide and legislation professor on the University of Alabama, mentioned he doesn’t see “the absence of an Additional Protocol as, by itself, cause for alarm.” He mentioned that the US-Saudi bilateral settlement is “a reasonable way to supplement Saudi Arabia’s existing IAEA safeguards, though the adequacy … ultimately depends on its still-unpublished terms.”
Stricker mentioned there is no such thing as a protected approach to permit enrichment or reprocessing on Saudi Arabia soil, although, even when such a facility had been established underneath American management.
“You can’t be sure that the Saudis would not try to nationalize a facility,” she mentioned. “Then the US president in power at the time would be faced with whether they would have to bomb the facility to try to prevent a breakout or something of that sort.”
Saudi technicians and scientists engaged on enrichment centrifuges may additionally apply their information in different secret amenities, Stricker recommended. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was launched in the same method after scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan is believed to have relied upon centrifuge blueprints from a European firm who employed him to kickstart Pakistan’s program. Khan is believed to have additionally shared his information with Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Pakistan maintains that Khan acted alone when promoting the expertise.
Joyner mentioned he believes the advantages of Saudi peaceable nuclear cooperation outweigh “the existence of some residual proliferation risk.” One argument in favor of cooperation is that it would create a profitable business marketplace for America’s resurgent nuclear trade, which aligns with the Trump administration’s power coverage objectives. Another is the danger that Russia or China would give the Saudis the phrases they need with much less efficient safeguards.
The Arms Control Association’s Davenport cautioned, although, that establishing the precedent of “bespoke” nuclear safeguards preparations may allow Russia and China to do the identical with different international locations.
“How would the United States feel if Russia started pushing its own bilateral safeguards in lieu of more intrusive IAEA standards?” she mentioned.
Davis Winkie’s work at NCS is supported by a partnership between Outrider Foundation and Journalism Funding Partners (JFP). NCS retains full editorial management of the reporting.