Executive Summary:
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Iran’s community of state-run “innovation houses” and commerce platforms is a predominant channel for buying sanctioned dual-use know-how from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Like the oil commerce, it’s steered from the highest on each side and shielded by mutual deniability.
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The Iranian Vice Presidency for Science, Technology, and Knowledge-Based Economy (VPST) and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked arm, embeds Iranian companies within the PRC’s military-civil fusion and united entrance techniques, and steers them towards military-linked suppliers.
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Throughput remains to be modest, however wartime devastation, a brand new U.S. oil-sanctions waiver, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s elevation as Iran’s particular envoy for the PRC are hardening the community right into a sturdy procurement pipeline, positioned to faucet into the proposed $300 billion reconstruction fund.
At a press convention in April, Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang (张晓刚) denied allegations that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had despatched air-defense techniques and drones to Iran throughout its battle with the United States and Israel (MND, April 30). The Foreign Ministry and Chinese ambassador to Israel have been simply as vehement when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Beijing of offering navy help to Tehran’s missile program (Ynet, May 12). By the top of May, intelligence sources confirmed to U.S. media that the F-15 downed in early April was introduced down by a Chinese-made Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS), the primary lack of an American fighter jet to enemy fireplace because the 2003 Iraq War (NBC, May 30).
The PRC’s clandestine protection and financial lifelines to Iran stay the Middle East’s worst-kept secret. On June 10, per week earlier than the U.S.–Iran cease-fire was introduced, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned 9 Chinese and Hong Kong entities for exporting navy know-how to Iran (Department of the Treasury, June 10). Their names have been added to the roster of greater than 360 PRC- and Hong Kong-based entities that sit on the checklist of specifically designated nationals (SDN) for Iran-related misconduct, from shifting oil to supplying dual-use supplies for weapons applications (USCC, November 14, 2025).
Investigations have detailed how PRC-Iranian cooperation depends on covert monetary networks coordinated on the highest ranges of each governments. These networks embody the ghost armada of tankers, the de-dollarized barter system insured by the state, the motion of missile precursors by Chinese ports, and the unfastened ecosystem of nominally civilian Chinese companies working the availability chains behind Iran’s drone manufacturing (U.S. Department of State, April 10, 2025; Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2025; Jerusalem Post, March 9; China Brief, April 3).
One node on this tech-transfer ecosystem has gone largely understudied. In July 2025, after the 12-day battle with Israel, Iran’s Vice Presidency for Science, Technology, and Knowledge-Based Economy (VPST-KBE) informed state media that its newly-established Iran House of Innovation and Technology (iHiT) in Beijing stood prepared to mobilize assets and safe industrial items and applied sciences. The report described the iHiTs as “some of the most important executive arms of the VPST” for facilitating know-how transfers between Iranian and international entities, with its PRC branches amongst “the most active of these centers” (Mehr News Agency, July 13, 2025).
Following the newest spherical of the battle, with a lot of Iran’s military-industrial base destroyed, the PRC-based fronts are set to play a central position within the regime’s reconstruction.
‘Knowledge-Based’ Connections Divert Sanctions Pressure
The institutional roots of the Beijing iHiT hint again to the early 2010s, when crippling sanctions drove Tehran towards new income sources. The VPST, a cabinet-level physique underneath the Supreme Leader, was chosen to lead the cost on two fronts.
First, it was tasked with weaning the economic system off its reliance on fossil-fuel exports, although outcomes have been combined. By Tehran’s personal rely, knowledge-based companies jumped from 55 in 2013 to greater than 10,000 by 2024, with income reaching 1,833 trillion toman ($18.3 billion) by March 2025, a 60 % rise (VPST, September 5, 2025). Yet hydrocarbons nonetheless made up roughly 57 % of exports in 2024, and knowledge-based items simply 5 % (CITNA, December 15, 2024; GIS Reports, September 1, 2025).
The second aim was to keep entry to worldwide markets, suppliers, and financing whereas avoiding sanctions. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s 2014 directive proclaimed Iran the “economy of resistance,” with the knowledge-based sector particularly designated for this goal (Khamenei.ir, February 18, 2014). The vice presidency expanded its worldwide footprint in response. The first department opened within the PRC in 2015, and it took six extra years for Tehran to open new branches in different nations, in addition to its headquarters in Tehran. By 2024, iHiT had 12 branches in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America (CITNA, February 14, 2024).
The three-story Tehran headquarters acts as an expo for up to 2,000 merchandise and hosts delegations organized by the Foreign Ministry and the Trade Promotion Organization underneath the Ministry of Industry, Mine, and Trade. A nominally non-public fund funds foreign-market entry and runs a web based iHiT “market” whose catalogues checklist dual-use objects, together with unmanned aerial autos (UAVs) and remotely operated underwater autos (Kharon, February 11, 2025). Abroad, the branches place Iranian companies in international markets, supply parts, vet suppliers, deal with logistics and certification, and transfer cash by channels sanctions would in any other case shut.
Table 1: iHiT’s Global Reach
Both Nodes Linked to Sanctioned Entities
The first PRC-based department opened in May 2015 on the Iran Nanotechnology China Center (INCC; 伊朗纳米技术中国中心), a government-to-government enterprise inside a state-owned park hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) known as Nanopolis Suzhou (Suzhou Industrial Park, May 13, 2015). Under its long-serving director, nanoscientist Amir Ghorbanali, the workplace grew from a small store into an export base for all Iranian knowledge-based merchandise, with a second department opening in Guangzhou in 2018 (Tehran Times, July 11, 2018). Over time, the VPST constructed six “brands” within the PRC: a biomedical engineering heart; a everlasting Iran High-Tech Pavilion on the China International Import Expo (CIIE) in Shanghai; a water-treatment heart; the China–Iran Trade Promotion Center, which coordinates participation in Chinese commerce gala’s; and the China–Iran House of Innovation and Technology (CIHIT) in Suzhou (ODISTC, February 11, 2021). The new Beijing iHiT workplace is the sixth department. It is bodily situated at CITIC Tower, and is fronted by the VPST’s Arvand Business Group, which additionally runs Iran’s CIIE pavilion.
The six branches report to the VPST’s worldwide arm, the Organization for the Development of International Cooperation in Science and Technology (ODISTC). ODISTC follows the institutional lineage of the sanctioned Office of Scientific and Technical Cooperation, which is designated for supporting Iran’s weapons of mass destruction program and navy procurement. Its chief, Hossein Roozbeh, teaches at Imam Hossein University, the principle navy academy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and is reportedly affiliated with the IRGC’s Quds Force (Langar Khabar, February 1, 2022; Global Fight Against Terrorism Funding, April 4, 2023). CIHIT’s personal brochures describe actions that open clear evasion channels, comparable to exporting dual-use items to the PRC and third nations, and “facilitating the supply of materials and components” for Iranian companies (ODISTC, February 11, 2021). A WHOIS registration lookup of its area (ihit[.]cn) ties it to Beijing Shouneng Haoye Engineering (北京首能昊业工程), a entrance for Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, whose Shanghai expo hosts a number of Treasury-designated petrochemical companies. [1] 13 of the 16 Iranian corporations on the Beijing iHiT’s web site are sanctioned, and roughly 1 / 4 of the 62 companies promoted by the Suzhou-based China–Iran Trade Promotion Center are on entity lists for his or her roles throughout Iran’s metal, mining, petrochemicals, energy infrastructure, and maritime logistics industries.
The Chinese aspect can also be in danger. Corporate information, procurement notices, and business profiles present that Nanopolis hosts quite a few nationwide our bodies chargeable for standardizing know-how for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Party-state’s area and expertise applications (Suzhou Municipal Government, March 29, 2023; SIMIT, May 30). Representatives of iFLYTEK (科大讯飞) and CloudWalk Technology (云从科技), each on the U.S. Entity List over nationwide safety and human rights considerations, attended the 2016 CAS–VPST signing in Tehran, which established the Silk Road Science Fund to help joint PRC–Iran analysis and exchanges in fields together with nanotechnology, cognitive science, medical tools, IT, and synthetic intelligence (AI) (Fars News Agency, October 15, 2021). CIHIT’s Iranian industrial supervisor holds levels from Beihang University (北京航空航天大学), one of many entity-listed “seven sons of national defense” (国防七子). Another managerial determine within the Iranian hubs holds possession in a Chinese government-designated “Little Giant” (小巨人), that’s, a producer of essential element applied sciences, and on this case, pogo-pin connectors utilized in radar and aerospace gear.
The clearest case of CIHIT’s position in sourcing dual-use applied sciences is its courtship of Nanjing Quankong Aviation Technology (AllController; 南京全控航空科技), a excessive‑tech producer specializing in movement‑simulation techniques and management applied sciences, particularly multi‑axis (3/6‑diploma‑of‑freedom, 6‑DoF) movement platforms. At a March 2023 seminar CIHIT hosted with AllController, director Ghorbanali provided the middle as a “bridge for communication” for AI and IT, whereas the Chinese firm demonstrated its movement platforms to its Iranian visitors (AllController, March 15, 2023). While lower-payload movement platforms serve leisure functions, comparable to race automotive simulators or theme park rides, these dual-use platforms are strictly regulated by international and U.S. export controls. In the aerospace and protection industries, they serve clear navy capabilities by offering high-fidelity flight and fight car simulation coaching, in addition to permitting the testing and calibration of precision steering techniques and sensor payloads. In AllController’s case, the corporate brazenly boasts military-grade certifications and PLA science awards, and its founder, Xiang Tiewu (相铁武), as soon as led the UAV division in a analysis institute underneath the Central Military Commission (China Daily, December 8, 2021).
Figure 1: Amir Ghorbanali seen at a seminar held by AllController
United Front and Convicted Criminals Facilitate Relationship
The relationships between the Iranian and PRC sides are managed partly by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) united entrance system, which seeks to coopt these outdoors the Party or, failing that, neutralizing any dangers they may trigger it. As a part of the united entrance’s remit of enhancing the Party’s energy, it really works to domesticate non-Party elites and run a hybrid tech-transfer equipment that mixes authorized, unlawful, and extralegal channels (Joske and Stoff, 2020). [2] The 2023 seminar was co-hosted by a physique underneath the China Association for Science and Technology, a “people’s organization” (人民团体)—a part of the united entrance system—that’s closely tied to navy industries and solutions to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a central united entrance physique.
Since President Xi Jinping’s go to to Iran in 2016, senior united front-linked officers have cultivated sanctions-circumventing ties with the VPST. Among them are former minister of science and know-how and long-time chairman of the China Zhi Gong Party Wan Gang (万钢), former CCP International Liaison Department head Song Tao (宋涛), and former United Front Work Department head Liu Yandong (刘延东) (People’s Daily, January 23, 2016; Ministry of Science and Technology, October 2016; Xinhua, April 22, 2017; ILD, November 16, 2019).
The Iran–China High-Level Business Forum in November 2023 could reveal the united entrance’s specific position in overlaying intelligence, covert tech-transfers, and the CCP’s method to tactical alliances for these functions. The occasion was co-hosted in Shanghai by CIHIT and Wujie SaaS (无界公司), whose founder, Tang Qingnan (唐庆南), is a convicted fraudster behind the PRC’s largest suspected pyramid scheme, value renminbi (RMB) 3.8 billion ($618 million), in accordance to Party-state media (NetEase, June 21; Baidu Baike/唐庆南, accessed June 24). Even although Tang was to end his ten-year jail time period only some months earlier than the occasion, his firm Wujie was the one Chinese co-host, and the discussion board gave Tang direct entry to then-first vice chairman Mohammad Mokhber, sanctioned as a former IRGC officer (Wujie SaaS, November 8, 2023)
Figure 2: Tang Qingnan and Iran’s VP Mohammad Mokhber on the 2023 Iran–China High-Level Business Forum in Shanghai
Conclusion
Iran’s tech-transfer system with the PRC is now coordinated on the high however structured to evade scrutiny in ways in which serve the pursuits of each governments. The iHiT platforms are its open face, brokering introductions, financing, and certification, steering Iranian companies towards dual-use suppliers like AllController. The covert face is a scattered net of small Chinese companies with civilian-sounding scopes that ship drone engines and elements under the attain of export controls (China Brief, April 3). Neither might function inside state-owned parks, CAS institutes, and PLA-linked companies with out the Party-state’s course and help.
On June 19, the primary Chinese industrial ship because the blockade docked at Chabahar’s Shahid Kalantari Port with 409 containers of commercial cargo, from car elements to drilling tools and metal pipe (Mehr News Agency, June 20). The iHiT community is constructed to deal with the excessive finish of that visitors.
By quantity, the pipeline nonetheless falls in need of what Tehran needs and Beijing might ship. In 2021, the iHiT within the PRC had concluded solely $2.5 million throughout greater than 15 export contracts over six years (FARS, October 15, 2021). Each new department, joint lab, and cooperation settlement signed since, nevertheless, has lowered the price of the following deal and tied Iranian procurement extra tightly into Chinese military-industrial provide chains. With the memorandum with the United States proposing a $300 billion Reconstruction and Development Fund for Iran, the networks constructed within the PRC to evade sanctions are actually positioned to spend the proceeds of lifting them.
This article initially appeared in China Brief. Check it out here!
Tuvia Gering is a non-resident fellow on the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a visiting fellow on the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Diane and Guilford Glazer Israel-China Policy Center.
Notes
[1] WHOIS is an open-source area title, web site, and IP registry.
[2] Alex Joske and Jeffrey Stoff, “The United Front and Technology Transfer,” in China’s Quest for Foreign Technology, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2020), https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003035084/china-quest-foreign-technology.