State-owned enterprises and commercial space in China

A Long March 4B lifts off earlier this month. It is constructed by one among a number of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the space {industry}. (credit score: Xinhua)

by Owen Chbani
Monday, December 22, 2025

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are these of the creator and don’t essentially replicate the views or insurance policies of the United States Government.

Although it’s handy to adapt American conceptions of “new space” commercial entities pitted towards “traditional” aerospace primes to the Chinese aerospace panorama,[1] Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a a lot completely different position in their commercial ecosystem. China has had an extended historical past of state-owned commercial space actions, starting in 1990 with the launch of AsiaSat-1 by the China Great Wall Industries Corporation.

Since the 2014 Document 60, which opened the space sector to personal funding, China has seen an explosion of personal space enterprises alongside the big SOEs. This paper goals to discover the evolving position of SOEs in China’s space ecosystem and argue that SOEs have been essential to the formation of the nascent commercial space sector. Chinese SOEs contribute to the success of commercial space corporations by way of: (1) expertise attraction and centralization performing as “hubs” that commercial corporations cluster round; (2) conducting elementary and utilized R&D; and (3) offering financing and know-how to commercial corporations.

Major SOEs in the Space Sector

Although China has greater than 150,000 SOEs, solely 96 are administered immediately by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Council (SASAC).[2] The two main “space” SOEs, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), make use of a whole lot of 1000’s of workers between them, with dozens of subsidiaries.[3,4] CASC retains the vast majority of space know-how capabilities, liable for implementing the Tiangong program, the lunar program, in addition to many of the Long March autos. CASIC is primarily a protection contractor, liable for growing missiles for the PLA, however retains expertise in strong launch autos, anti-satellite weapons, microsatellites, and electronics.[5] Other SOEs take part in space actions however don’t lead main applications.

Unlike the United States, the place most civil space exploration is centralized at NASA, China has a trilateral construction with the Chinese National Space Agency (CNSA), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), and China Manned Spaceflight Agency (CMSA). The CMSA reviews to the Central Military Commission (CMC), in contrast to the civilian State Council, which the CNSA reviews to. While the CNSA oversees most civil space efforts, the CAS units its personal priorities and develops science missions independently. The CMSA develops, operates, and oversees China’s human spaceflight applications, together with Tiangong, Shenzhou, and the lunar program. All three work intently with SOEs to develop a lot of the {hardware} wanted.

Figure 1: Selected Chinese state-owned and governmental space organizations[6]

Commercial space in China 1986–2014

China’s experiment with commercial space actions started in 1986 as a technique to promote launches to overseas and home clients by way of the China Great Wall Industries Corporation (GWIC)—a subsidiary of CASC—at a time when world launch capability was constrained post-Challenger.[7] The success of this effort was instantly obvious, with China launching 27 satellites by 2000, bringing in billions in overseas forex.[8]

Chinese SOEs pursued joint ventures with overseas firms as a part of a method to achieve overseas know-how in change for entry to Chinese markets. In one occasion, Chinese SOEs, together with CASC and CAST, shaped China Galileo Industries to companion with the EU on the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) constellation Galileo. China Galileo Industries participated in the switch of essential GNSS applied sciences, together with atomic clocks, to China. When it grew to become clear that China was pursuing an unbiased BeiDou GNSS constellation, the connection rapidly fell aside.[9] In the 2000s, Chinese SOEs exported 17 satellites as “turnkey” options to growing nations by way of GWIC; GWIC procured and offered launch, satellite tv for pc, financing, and insurance coverage providers as a one-stop store to nations by working by way of the suitable SOEs.[10]

However, by the early 2010s, provincial and native governments acknowledged the monetary difficulties related to a state-driven progress mannequin, and they turned to market forces and commercial investments to proceed pursuing their pursuits. From this shift got here the 2014 State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Innovating Investment and Financing Mechanisms in Key Areas (Document 60), is extensively credited with kicking off the commercial space {industry} in China. In the doc, the federal government acknowledges the brand new position authorities spending will play in “guiding and driving” commercial funding in socially necessary areas.[11]

Document 60 additionally joined a flurry of pointers and legal guidelines in 2014 that aimed to advertise public-private partnerships, demonstrating that the Chinese have been starting to experiment with their potential to deliver market forces to bear by way of pilot applications and establishing a “leading group” of senior members of the CPC.[12] Only one paragraph of the doc mentions the commercial space {industry}, highlighting distant sensing applied sciences and satellite tv for pc navigation. Launch autos obtain solely a passing point out, with no point out of satellite tv for pc communications. This doc, together with the twelfth five-year plan, would form the implementation of market-enabling reforms in China’s space sector.

The 2015-2025 National Medium- to Long-Term Civilian Space Infrastructure Development Plan started to implement market reforms, in addition to lay out a complete plan for priorities, which might assist anchor later commercial investments. The Plan recognized three main areas: satellite tv for pc distant sensing, satellite tv for pc communications and broadcasting, and satellite tv for pc navigation and positioning.[13] It additionally outlined 4 rules of improvement, which embrace two particularly calling out the position personal actors would play in reaching the objectives of the plan:

1. Innovation-driven, autonomous improvement: The Plan requires “independent innovation” in addition to linking technical R&D to enterprise purposes, essential steps for enabling a commercial sector by permitting it to leverage present R&D efforts whereas giving space for exploration of fields not at the moment thought-about by ministries.

2. Government steering, open improvement: This part explicitly calls out the position of presidency in insisting on “top-level planning and overall coordinated management” whereas establishing mechanisms to advertise sharing and industrialization of civil space infrastructure. In a robust message, the Plan “Give[s] free rein to the decisive role of the market in the allocation of resources” in assist of a concerted push in the direction of reaching an “open development plan” involving stakeholders throughout authorities, personal, and social sectors.[14]

While it grew to become clear that China was pursuing a market-forward method to space improvement, it’s also necessary to outline what the implementation of market forces appears like throughout the Chinese system. In 2015, clear steering on SOEs was issued, calling for his or her continued reform in the direction of market-based methods, claiming that “The market entity status of some enterprises has not yet been truly established”.[15] The doc continued on to section SOEs based mostly on the markets they participated in, starting from established markets with clear market-driven competitors the place “State-owned capital can hold absolute control, relative control, or a minority stake,” to SOEs in industries “related to national security and the lifeline of the national economy,” which “should maintain the controlling position of state-owned capital and support non-state-owned capital participation.”[16] This represents a transparent route in the direction of the aerospace SOEs, which have continued to place themselves as essential companions to the Chinese authorities’s space ambitions and smaller commercial corporations.

China’s authorities’s newest 2021 white paper on space actions expressly calls out the necessity for SOEs to have interaction in “the transfer and transformation of space technologies” to commercial actors, in addition to an ecosystem the place “large, small, and medium-sized enterprises advance in an integrated way.” This idea pairs with SOE reforms to determine a framework for the commercialization of China’s space sector. China will possible keep SOEs like CASC and CASIC as suppliers of infrastructure and space applied sciences essential to nationwide objectives, whereas concurrently encouraging them to selectively apply market-based rules when useful. Simultaneously, giant SOEs and state enterprises will play a key position in anchoring and supporting the commercial space {industry}, which shall be allowed to commercialize applied sciences and merchandise for societal improvement.

While these commercial corporations could compete with SOEs in sure sectors, it’s clear that the Chinese authorities needs to retain SOE management over essential providers and space applied sciences. A key instance of that is the “commercial” procurement of China’s next-generation cargo spacecraft. The two winners, Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (IAMCAS) and the Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research Institute underneath the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), are government-run and SOE-run, respectively.[17] This makes it clear that China’s commercial sector will stay largely quasi-governmental; nonetheless, makes an attempt at venture-backed innovation have been explicitly inspired.

Premier Li Qiang particularly known as out the promise of commercial aerospace efforts in the 2025 work report, in addition to the significance of supporting “unicorn enterprises and gazelle enterprises.”[18] Unicorn firms are personal entities with valuations over $1 billion, whereas gazelles are startups with quickly rising revenues and valuations at $100 million,[19] highlighting the significance of those firms demonstrates an consciousness that a lot of China’s innovation throughout sectors will depend on stimulating a various base of commercial innovation. The following part will determine the position SOEs play in constructing and supporting that commercial ecosystem.

Provincial and native coverage efforts to stimulate a commercial space {industry}

Chinese innovation coverage is uniquely decentralized, with nationwide coverage guiding provincial actions whereas most funding is disbursed by provincial and native governments. This has led to a proliferation of commercial space “action plans” by provinces throughout China. These plans set detailed objectives for the event of native industries, universities, and funding funds. This decentralized method has led many commercial space enterprises to decentralize operations, to seize as a lot authorities assist as potential, giving rise to the nationwide panorama seen at this time.[20]

SOEs as anchors for commercial hubs

Several students level to a number of hubs in China’s commercial space ecosystem as a key aspect of its space panorama. Most notably, Beijing has attracted greater than 200 commercial space ventures by way of a mix of things. Both CASC and CASIC are headquartered in the area, offering a big expertise base for commercial corporations to have interaction.[21] Chinese corporations and provinces each particularly pursue a method of “agglomeration,” which seeks to maximise data spillovers, entry to expertise, infrastructure, authorities assist, and suppliers. These hubs are “anchored” by SOEs, which construct infrastructure and expertise bases that appeal to commercial corporations.[22] In many instances, CASC and CASIC are immediately enlisted by native provinces to determine hubs, with Xi’an’s National Civil Aerospace Industrial Base a direct cooperation between native governments and CASC.[23] Wuhan has engaged with CASIC to assemble the Wuhan Aerospace Base, and SAST has partnered with Ningbo to develop a commercial spaceport and industrial base in the area.[24]

Beyond infrastructure, a key issue in the success of commercial corporations is their entry to expertise. A outstanding case research of commercial corporations benefiting from SOE-developed expertise is Zhang Xiaoping’s 2018 departure from the Xi’an Aerospace Propulsion Institute, a CASC subsidiary, to DeepBlue Aerospace. After his departure, the SOE claimed that he was “poached” and that his absence would severely impression lunar lander improvement efforts.[25] This introduced wider consideration to the difficulty of commercial corporations poaching expertise from SOEs, with an official claiming that a number of commercial space startups have arrange headquarters close by, explicitly aiming to poach expertise from his firm, providing wages three to 5 instances increased.[26] Additionally, nearly all workers at key Chinese startups like iSpace come from SOEs like CASC and CASIC.[27]

Without robust mental property safety legal guidelines and governmental R&D freely accessible to the commercial {industry} (ex. NASA), brain-drain from main SOEs permits commercial corporations to innovate with out huge investments in human capital and R&D. CASC responded to the incident by stating it goals to “build a commercial aerospace community.”[28] In 2019, CASC delivered a keynote on the Commercial Aerospace Summit Forum titled: “Model Innovation, Openness, Win-Win Cooperation, and Joint Development of Commercial Aerospace.”[29] The keynote confirmed CASC was implementing rocket designs particularly for small satellites, constellations, and tailor-made inclinations, all desired by commercial {industry}. In addition, CASC dedicated to continued exploration of “new models of commercial aerospace,” in addition to “establish a commercial aerospace industry chain,” exhibiting that it sought to construct commercial capabilities in partnership with a broader ecosystem, embracing the position of SOEs as anchors for commercial space hubs.

SOEs as R&D engines for innovation

As alluded to beforehand, SOEs play a essential position in China’s innovation ecosystem, linking universities, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and commercial corporations. CASC and its subsidiaries have inked a number of offers with universities and the Chinese Academy of Sciences to develop R&D capability in service of innovation.

A 2012 CASC settlement with the CAS highlighted a historical past of collaboration starting from DongFangHong-1, China’s first satellite tv for pc, to “manned spaceflight and lunar exploration.” The settlement goals to deepen collaboration on fundamental analysis, expertise maturation, and particular areas together with electronics, floor stations, and supplies.[30] A 2016 settlement between Tsinghua University and CASC highlighted the necessity for useful resource sharing, know-how switch mechanisms, and expertise coaching applications, in addition to collaborative analysis throughout a broad vary of aerospace applied sciences.[31] Most notably, in 2010, CASC spent 500 million yuan (about $70 million) to create the Harbin Institute of Technology Aerospace Science and Technology Innovation Research Institute, China’s largest aerospace analysis institute on the time.[32] Harbin Institute of Technology is without doubt one of the “Seven Sons of National Defense” run immediately by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, spends nearly 2 billion yuan (about $300 million) on protection R&D, and sends over 20% of its graduates to CASC, CASIC, and AVIC.[33] CASC has greater than 20 agreements with universities throughout the nation.[34]

SOEs additionally function unbiased analysis laboratories, built-in inside China’s broader laboratory system. Two predominant classes exist: State Key Laboratories (SKLs) and Defense S&T State Key Laboratories (DSTKLs). While the overwhelming majority are overseen by the Ministry of Education, the Chinese Academy of Science, and numerous different authorities ministries, a number of are overseen by CASC and different giant SOEs. CASC supervises 15 SKLs, in addition to 16 nationwide engineering analysis facilities, which assist apply the essential analysis developed at SKLs to bodily methods, performing because the spine of the nation’s innovation system.

Looking to encourage a broader innovation ecosystem, MIIT, CASC, and CASIC have partnered to host China Aerospace Innovation & Entrepreneurship Competitions throughout the nation aimed toward enhancing the commercialization of modern analysis and merchandise from smaller corporations and universities in service of the “space dream” outlined by Xi Jinping.[35] Winning groups are rewarded with prizes, in addition to consideration from SOEs, traders, and the federal government.

This innovation is subtle by way of numerous mechanism, together with the expertise rotation talked about earlier, in addition to formal mechanisms resembling a “matchmaking” convention hosted by the Cangzhou native authorities, which invited CASC, CASIC, native universities, and greater than 200 enterprises from the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area to debate potential cooperation between the big SOEs and personal corporations to construct a “new model of integrated development of aerospace technology” in the area.[36] CASC’s “Technology Transfer Base” in Cangzhou seeks to construct upon these efforts by changing the “advanced technologies” developed by “Manned spaceflight, lunar exploration, the launch of the Gaofen series of satellites” into “‘new engines’ for the high-quality development of local economies.”[37] Additionally, the native Aerospace Industrial Park hosts consultants from SOEs to assist in mission administration and funding analysis.[38]

SOEs as backers for commercial space ventures

SOEs assist commercial enterprises in two methods: both by creating commercial subsidiaries aimed toward commercial operations topic to market forces or by backing present commercial enterprises by way of capital investments.

CASIC’s Wuhan-based ExPace subsidiary is without doubt one of the first quasi-commercial entities in China’s commercial space panorama. Founded in 2016 to market the Kuaizhou collection of launch autos, immediately based mostly on the DF-21 missile,[39] it represented a traditional try by SOEs to commercialize operations by way of passing on operations to a commercial entity. The first launch of the KZ-1A rocket can be a satellite tv for pc developed by CASIC itself.[40] Alongside point out of ExPace, CASIC’s Chairman, Gao Hongwei, emphasised CASIC’s position in “vigorously promoting the development of the commercial aerospace industry.” [41]

China Rocket represents CASC’s try at commercialization by permitting commercial procurement of the Long March collection of rockets developed by CALT. In addition to being a easy operator and vendor, mirroring CGWIC’s enterprise in the Eighties and Nineteen Nineties, China Rocket has additionally developed the Jielong collection of rockets, funded purely by way of “social capital” to serve commercial small satellite tv for pc constellation wants.[42] In addition, distributors have been chosen on the idea of value competitors, permitting a less expensive improvement course of. While ExPace seeks to market a civilian conversion of present army {hardware}, China Rocket’s inside improvement of the Jielong rocket represents a way more fulsome try and adapt to market calls for, though it goals to enrich the prevailing Long March collection fairly than provide a commercial various.

CASC’s funding arm, China Aerospace Investment Holdings (CAIH), has described industrial funding as essential to stimulating a commercial spaceflight {industry}.[43] It immediately calls out the significance of fundraising to SpaceX’s success, which on the time had undergone 46 rounds of financing at a valuation of $130 billion. CAIH has supported CASC’s commercial subsidiaries, together with China Rocket and Liquid Rocket Engine. It additionally seeks to take a position in small and medium enterprises underneath the mantra, “Invest early, invest in small businesses, invest in technology.”[44] Through its assist, CAIH seeks to construct a various and strong provide chain, benefitting CASC, in addition to commercial space enterprises throughout the nation.

Importantly, CAIH acknowledges the challenges in funding bold technical initiatives, which it describes as needing monetary assist that understands their “long cycle and high risk” nature. CAIH additionally identifies the well-known valley of demise, from patent to commercial product, and goals to assist promising startups by way of this “perilous leap.”[45] CAIH participates as a Limited Partner (LP) in numerous enterprise capital funds aimed toward supporting commercial enterprises in: aerospace data know-how,[46] army aerospace know-how,[47] and satellite tv for pc know-how purposes.[48] This integration of enterprise capital and industrial capability creates a strong alignment of incentives for broader provide chain assist, with advantages to commercial spaceflight enterprises, but it stays to be seen if CAIH will proceed to assist CASC commercial subsidiaries on the expense of a really aggressive market. Despite this, China Rocket and Liquid Rocket Engine do present key enabling applied sciences to China’s commercial sector, serving to firms keep away from R&D prices by offering launch and propulsion know-how at market-competitive costs.

Conclusion

SOEs play an enormous, and understudied, position in shaping China’s commercial ecosystem. Through deep partnerships with native governments and universities, they kind the spine of China’s commercial space clusters. SOEs are additionally essential hyperlinks in the “triple-helix” innovation system amongst {industry}, academia, and authorities, and their well-trained personnel deliver essential know-how to commercial enterprises. Finally, they supply key financing to commercial subsidiaries, which develop merchandise and providers that assist allow industry-wide innovation, whereas concurrently investing in commercial space enterprises and guaranteeing strong provide chains, which advantages all individuals. Existing literature additionally demonstrates the potential for SOEs to behave as efficient enhances to personal enterprises in R&D heavy industries, though this requires cautious coverage oversight and autonomy to be efficient.[49]

However, SOEs have been topic to quite a few reforms and directives, out of a recognition that they’ve did not evolve into agile, market-oriented organizations. An unwillingness to permit commercial enterprises to tackle essential aspects of the civil and army applications will stop commercial corporations from ever reaching the dimensions essential to conduct vital ranges of R&D, in addition to to learn from economies of scale. China’s megaconstellation panorama is dominated by two firms, China SatNet and Shanghai SpaceCom (SSST). Both have about 100 satellites on orbit, far behind western firms: SpaceX’s Starlink has greater than 9,000; OneWeb has about 650, and Amazon Leo has 180. Their deployment has been hamstrung by technical points and launcher shortages,[50,51] demonstrating the challenges China’s space ecosystem is dealing with in scaling to match western capabilities. Additionally, China SatNet is an SOE, whereas SSST is a non-public enterprise, however successfully backed by the Shanghai authorities and Chinese Academy of Science.[52]

This structural exclusion of Chinese commercial corporations from high-value, high-scale actions has led to a lot smaller headcounts in comparison with comparable American corporations. Figure 2 demonstrates this imbalance.

Figure 2: Headcounts of Chinese Firms and American Counterparts

These smaller corporations signify a minuscule fraction of the Chinese aerospace workforce, making large-scale R&D and innovation tough. More than 3,500 workers are engaged on SpaceX’s Starship program in South Texas alone, and that is earlier than this system has reached operational ranges.[63] It stays to be seen if Chinese corporations can successfully match the improvements in launch and satellite tv for pc know-how which have revolutionized the space {industry} in the United States, but it’s changing into more and more clear that SOEs will play a essential position in Chinese efforts to construct a globally aggressive commercial space {industry}.

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Owen Chbani is a grasp’s scholar at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute. The views expressed in this paper are these of the creator and don’t essentially replicate the views or insurance policies of the United States Government.

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