Wendy Mao, Stanford’s Earth Sciences Chair and Deputy Director of Stanford’s Institute for Materials and Energy Sciences at SLAC, has co-authored over 50 publications, skilled 5 staff, and maintained a visiting scholar place at HPSTAR, an “alias” for China’s nuclear weapons program.
In 2020, the Center for High Pressure Science and Technology, or HPSTAR, was added to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which identifies organizations that pose a big danger to nationwide safety. Since its 2020 Entity List designation, Professor Mao has co-authored at the least 12 peer-reviewed papers with HPSTAR.
The U.S. Entity List describes HPSTAR as a company “owned by, operated by, or directly affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), which is the technology complex responsible for the research, development and testing of China’s nuclear weapons and has been on the Entity List under the destination of China since June 30, 1997.”
According to Canada’s 2024 Named Research Organizations List, HPSTAR is an “alias” for the establishment behind China’s nuclear weapons program.
HPSTAR research how supplies behave underneath excessive pressures and temperatures utilizing diamond-anvil cells, synchrotron beams, and X-ray diffraction. Mao is a leading U.S. researcher on this very subject.
In an interview with the Stanford Review, Professor Raymond Jeanloz, a UC Berkeley high-pressure supplies researcher and former chair of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control, acknowledged:
“It is true that high-pressure experiments are used by scientists working on the domain of nuclear weapons. If anyone is using the diamond anvil cell or shock waves to study materials relevant to nuclear weapons, that’s highly sensitive. If those same methods are then applied to sensitive nuclear materials, the combination of these kinds of experiments with these materials starts raising eyebrows.”
Both Mao and HPSTAR extensively use diamond anvil cells and shock waves to review supplies.
Mao and HPSTAR’s public analysis papers don’t instantly contain weapons testing, design, or improvement. However, these exact high-pressure measurements and theoretical data are the mandatory foundations of contemporary nuclear and superior weapon design, the place correct modeling of supplies underneath detonation-level circumstances is crucial.
Professor Mao Collaborates With Alias for China’s Nuclear Weapons Program
Over the previous 20 years, Mao has co-authored at the least 50 publications with HPSTAR. Funding acknowledgments present that Wendy Mao and HPSTAR co-authored analysis financed by the next U.S. authorities companies:
- Department of Energy (together with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Argonne National Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Brookhaven National Laboratory)
- Defense Advanced Research Program Agency (DARPA)
- Department of Defense (DOD)
- National Science Foundation (NSF)
- National Institutes of Health (NIH)
- Army Research Office (ARO)
- National Aeronautics And Space Administration (NASA)
Trained HPSTAR PhD college students
Mao has trained at the least 5 HPSTAR staff as PhD college students in her Stanford and SLAC labs. At least one HPSTAR postdoctoral researcher concurrently labored on DOE, NNSA, and DARPA-funded analysis at SLAC.
For instance, one among Mao’s present PhD college students worked at HPSTAR for 3 years, from 2015 to 2018, receiving an M.S. in Condensed Matter Physics earlier than becoming a member of Stanford as a PhD scholar in Mao’s lab.
The different 4 had been skilled in Mao’s lab and returned to China to work at HPSTAR. These are solely the people we had been in a position to determine by way of net and archival searches.
In an interview with the Review, a high-ranking Trump 45 official with data of the matter acknowledged, “Mao has trained 5 PhD students affiliated with China’s nuclear weapons program. Stanford should not permit its federally funded research labs to become training grounds for entities affiliated with China’s nuclear program. Mao’s continued and extensive academic collaboration with HPSTAR is adequate grounds for termination.”
Visiting Scholar at HPSTAR
Mao served as a visiting scholar at HPSTAR’s Shanghai laboratory from at the least 2016 to 2019. She additionally maintains a HPSTAR electronic mail deal with. Her inner Stanford CV and profile record 43 affiliations, however they don’t disclose her place at HPSTAR.
In an interview with the Review, LJ Eads, a China research-security expert and developer of Data Abyss, a platform that analyzes U.S.–Chinese analysis collaboration, acknowledged, “For someone with access to SLAC and other national labs, foreign affiliations must be disclosed under DOE Order 486.1A. Dr. Mao’s undisclosed HPSTAR role and active HPSTAR email raise legitimate concerns about whether federal disclosure rules were followed and whether Stanford had the information needed to manage foreign-influence risk.”
As a professor with appointments at SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory and different delicate nationwide labs, Mao is topic to this disclosure requirement. Mao didn’t reply to a request for remark concerning her compliance with this requirement.
CAEP Affiliation
Mao has additionally co-authored papers in Matter and Radiation at Extremes, a journal owned by CAEP, China’s nuclear improvement group. She did so underneath a 2020 article titled “Key problems of the four-dimensional Earth system.”
The respective organizations accountable for the event of the U.S. and China’s nuclear weapons applications, the uss National Nuclear Security Administration and CAEP’s National Security Academic Fund, are co-funders for a number of of Mao’s tasks.
China’s nuclear program started the National Security Academic Fund to strengthen “exploratory national security basic scientific research.” According to leaked paperwork from China’s nuclear program, translated by Georgetown University, “The NSAF Fund has broken new ground for CAEP in attracting technological forces across China to start basic research with the pulling force of national security requirements.”
Mao is listed as a co-author, contributing the aforementioned “national security basic research,” to at the least 6 NSAF-funded analysis tasks with HPSTAR collaborators. In funding acknowledgments, HPSTAR is described as an establishment “supported by [CAEP’s] NSAF (grant no: U1530402).”
Wolf Amendment Concerns
On November 23, 2024, Mao was published as a co-author on a paper titled “Iron Bonding with Light Elements: Implications for Planetary Cores Beyond the Binary System.” Wenzhong Wang, from the University of Science and Technology of China, is listed as a collaborator. This paper additionally acknowledges funding from NASA’s Exoplanet Program.
The Wolf Amendment prohibits the usage of NASA grants from collaboration “with institutions of the People’s Republic of China.” According to NASA’s doc on the matter, “that means that it’s not enough that a NASA grantee simply avoids sending funds to PRC; rather, the grantee may not spend any NASA grant money on any part of a bilateral project with PRC.”
Eads additionally famous: “The Wolf Amendment bars NASA-funded researchers from participating in bilateral projects with Chinese institutions unless a waiver is granted. When a NASA-supported Stanford professor co-authors research with a scientist from a PRC university, the burden is on the institution to show an exemption. Stanford-Mao doesn’t have an exemption. Without one, this places the work squarely in a serious Wolf Amendment risk area.”
The Review was unable to confirm whether or not authorization for an exception was granted. Mao didn’t reply to a request for remark concerning her compliance with this requirement.
Export Control Requirements
As recently as September 12, 2025, Mao printed a paper with three HPSTAR co-authors. The analysis paper featured HPSTAR researchers utilizing cutting-edge tools at U.S. authorities laboratories, together with X-ray diffraction carried out by the High Pressure Collaborative Access Team at Argonne’s Advanced Photon Source, the Beamline 12.2.2 at Lawrence Berkeley’s Advanced Light Source, and XRD measurements supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Eads additional commented:
“Fundamental research is generally legal, but export controls still apply to hands-on access to sensitive equipment. When export-controlled lasers at SLAC or national laboratories intersect with Stanford HPSTAR-linked students [Mao’s SLAC-trained PhD students] and collaborators, it creates a real risk of transferring controlled U.S. technology and know-how to a PRC-aligned institution.”
The identical aforementioned official from Trump 45 additionally acknowledged, “HPSTAR should not have been granted access to or use of DOE national laboratories. Mao and her collaborators very likely facilitated the use of export-controlled items, including those regulated under the Export Administration Regulations, Category 6, such as sensors and lasers, and Category 3, including electronics and X-ray detectors, for HPSTAR, an institution affiliated with China’s nuclear weapons program. This is a shocking lapse of research security.”
Access to US National labs
For instance, a research project was authored by Wendy Mao, Jin Liu of HPSTAR (formerly a PhD scholar in Mao’s lab), and Yue Meng of Argonne National Laboratory, amongst others. The research is “supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration… acknowledges… the use of computing resources from Brookhaven National Laboratory… and X-ray diffraction… conducted at Argonne National Laboratory… HPSTAR is supported by NSAF.” In this case, the NNSA and CAEP’s NSAF are co-funding Chinese “exploratory national security basic scientific research,” utilizing delicate nationwide laboratories
Eads informed the Review that “Dr. Mao effectively provides HPSTAR-linked scientists access to U.S. national-lab resources, training, equipment, and funded research, through her positions at Stanford and SLAC. That kind of access is exactly what China’s research system tries to cultivate abroad.”
In 2023, Chairman Mike Lee of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources wrote a letter warning “Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Argonne National Laboratories regarding reports that researchers at all three labs have engaged in research collaborations leveraging… the PRC’s military for federally funded research in sensitive fields.”
Miscellaneous Defense Lab Affiliations
Beyond HPSTAR and CAEP, Wendy Mao carried out analysis with the Beijing Institute of Technology and Northwestern Polytechnical University (NWPU). Both establishments are a part of China’s Seven Sons of National Defense: key analysis establishments for the Chinese army. These publications acknowledge co-funding from the Department of Energy and DARPA.
Wendy Mao additionally carried out analysis with Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s National Key Laboratory of Science and Technology on Nano Fabrication, which can also be a key Chinese military-designated laboratory.
China’s Nuclear Programs: A History of Academic Espionage
Wendy Mao’s father, Ho-Kwang Mao, was one of many leading U.S. consultants in high-pressure physics, a basic science behind nuclear weapons improvement.
He led the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) co-sponsored Carnegie-DOE Alliance Center (CDAC). Under his supervision, the middle collaborated with and trained NNSA’s employees to make sure nuclear-weapons readiness and stockpile upkeep. Upon recruitment by CAEP in 2012, Ho-Kwang Mao established HPSTAR as a subordinate establishment.
Failure of Research Security
Drawing on testimony from China specialists, high-pressure supplies scientists, and publicly obtainable paperwork, our investigation confirms that Professor Wendy Mao has maintained in depth collaboration with organizations advancing China’s Nuclear Program. This raises a basic query: how ought to U.S. establishments reply? What is obvious is that the established order of inaction is untenable.
Over a yr in the past, Eads introduced documentation of Mao’s collaborations—together with her formal function at HPSTAR—to the Department of Energy, the FBI, and Stanford University. Yet federal companies, together with the DOE, DoD, DARPA, and a number of nationwide laboratories, proceed to fund analysis that intersects with U.S.-listed entities resembling HPSTAR.
To be clear, export-control restrictions, foreign-affiliation disclosure guidelines, and potential Wolf Amendment points stay related. But the majority of Mao’s work with HPSTAR appears to fall underneath the federal definition of basic analysis, which means the outcomes are “published and shared broadly, with no restrictions for proprietary or national-security reasons.” Under present legislation, such collaboration with a U.S.-listed entity is mostly permitted.
Wendy Mao’s case shouldn’t be an outlier. It is a revealing instance of a a lot bigger institutional drawback at Stanford. As Eads explains, “Mao’s case isn’t isolated. When I analyze Stanford publications, I find at least 1,300 papers involving entities tied to China’s military-civil fusion system. It’s a broader pattern of collaborations that link Stanford researchers to PRC institutions with clear defense relevance.”
In a world the place the nation that develops superior applied sciences features a decisive benefit, the United States can not afford strategic complacency. Protecting America’s scientific infrastructure calls for a coordinated response. Stanford University and the federal authorities should take critical, overdue steps to make sure the integrity of mission-critical analysis.
Professor Mao didn’t reply to a request for remark.
Author’s Note
This article is the second in a sequence overlaying the Chinese Communist Party’s affect at Stanford. To keep knowledgeable as particulars emerge, think about subscribing to the Stanford Review. If you might have any related details about this matter, ship it to [email protected]. To assist our work, please donate here.
This investigation is predicated on publicly obtainable authorities paperwork, educational publications, archival data, and interviews with impartial analysis and safety consultants and teachers. This article is a piece of journalism and public-interest reporting. It doesn’t supply authorized conclusions in any type.
This problem was first recognized and investigated by LJ Eads, a China research-security knowledgeable and developer of Data Abyss, a platform that analyzes U.S.–Chinese analysis collaboration. Having introduced this to our consideration, the Stanford Review initiated an investigation.