Policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities: framework, theory, and practice

Abstract

Policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities have emerged as a new approach to overcoming the ‘bottleneck’ technology challenges in the marine sector, which have been exacerbated by technological blockades imposed by developed countries. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of such policies from multiple dimensions, including their conceptual connotations, key components, main characteristics, theoretical interpretations, and practical applications. The study identifies five major policy directions that have emerged globally: breakthroughs in ‘bottleneck’ technologies, enhancement of maritime military capabilities, deep-sea resource development, marine industry innovation, and the strengthening of maritime governance and capacity building. These practices also exhibit a clear pattern of “development-stage alignment,” whereby high-income countries or regions focus on “innovation upgrading + hegemony maintenance,” while middle- and low-income countries or regions prioritize “basic capacity building + security assurance.” The core contribution of this article lies in constructing a systematic analytical framework of “concept-elements-characteristics-theory-practice” for such policies, clarifying their theoretical underpinnings and practical logic, and providing latecomer countries with a directly applicable theoretical framework and practical pathways for formulating marine strategic science and technology policies that are suited to their specific development stages.

1 Introduction

Marine strategic science and technology capabilities have become a critical factor in international maritime competition (Pan and Cui, 2025). Rising dangers and challenges—reminiscent of intensified maritime navy rivalry (Østhagen, 2021), rising deep-sea safety threats (Vivoda, 2024), and reliance on overseas nations for key marine core applied sciences (Dachwald et al., 2020)—have severely hindered the effectiveness of worldwide marine governance and the development of a governance system. As a bridge to reaching breakthroughs in marine science and technology innovation, marine innovation insurance policies function tangible instruments to strengthen nationwide marine strategic science and technology capabilities in response to those marine dangers and challenges (Brewer, 2017; Hills et al., 2021). The complexity and urgency of those challenges expose the weaknesses of conventional marine innovation coverage programs. These programs typically lack clear strategic aims, coordinated deployment of assets, and well-defined implementation pathways, making it troublesome to reply successfully to systemic shocks and societal wants. Consequently, many nations are actively exploring systematic intervention schemes within the marine sector centered on the “big science” framework (Anupama et al., 2021). Against this backdrop, the coverage for strengthen marine strategic science and technology capabilities is step by step rising as a task-driven, modern paradigm on a worldwide scale (Johnson et al., 2024; Saharuddin, 2001; Torres et al., 2015). According to OECD analysis studies, quite a few nations and areas worldwide have launched related key initiatives, such because the U.S. ARGO Program, the EU Marine Observation Coordination Program, and Germany’s “Baltic Sea Seagrass Blue Carbon Sink” analysis program.

As world marine competitors intensifies and technological transformation accelerates, there may be now a rising world consensus on the significance of strengthening nationwide marine strategic science and technology capabilities. Existing analysis primarily unfolds throughout three dimensions: strategic safety, technological innovation, and coverage governance (Barirani, 2022; Kusters et al., 2024). From the angle of strategic safety, marine safety is deeply embedded in nationwide safety frameworks. The United States focuses on enhancing maritime navy energy and selling technological innovation in navy ships and different areas (Gargano and Mouritz, 2023), whereas Japan, guided by the “Oceanic Nation” technique, advances the development of a maritime scenario consciousness system (Zhu et al., 2023). In phrases of technological innovation, deep-sea exploration and marine new vitality have emerged as key focus areas. The United Nations’ “Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021-2030)” (hereafter known as the “Ocean Decade”) has promoted worldwide collaborative efforts to sort out essential marine applied sciences (Blasiak et al., 2023), with China actively taking part in and main the initiative, reaching a collection of impartial R&D outcomes. From the coverage governance perspective, the coverage for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities demonstrates important benefits. China has leveraged its new nationwide system to interrupt by way of marine “bottleneck” technology blockades; the United States has relied on protection budgets and public-private partnerships to advertise the civilian software of marine navy applied sciences; and Japan has established inter-ministerial establishments to coordinate deep-sea useful resource improvement. These circumstances present theoretical and sensible references for growing nations to assemble adaptive coverage frameworks (Furlan et al., 2018).

However, current analysis has not but developed a scientific exploration of this coverage itself, leaving three main gaps: first, it has did not make clear the core ideas and attribute system of the coverage; second, it lacks theoretical explanations for its intervention legitimacy; and third, it has not systematically analyzed circumstances to supply universally relevant experiences. To tackle these gaps, this text constructs a progressive analytical framework structured as “conceptualization–element analysis–characteristic extraction–theoretical support–empirical validation.” Drawing on 5 typical worldwide circumstances, the framework is examined for feasibility, with the goal of filling the recognized analysis gaps and offering each theoretical and sensible references for latecomer nations in formulating related insurance policies.

2 Research methods and data sources

2.1 Research methods

This study combines a systematic review with a comparative case study approach, following the PRISMA guidelines for policy reviews. The literature search covers major international and Chinese databases including Web of Science and CNKI, as well as official policy platforms such as the OECD and UNESCO. The search period spans from 2000 to 2024, using key terms such as “marine strategic science and technology policy,” “transition failure,” and “marine key technologies,” among other relevant combinations. After undergoing three stages of screening—de-duplication, initial screening based on titles and abstracts, and full-text review—90 core documents were finally included in the analysis.

For the case selection, we followed principles of goal orientation, regional coverage, and practical representativeness. Five cases were chosen: China’s “Ocean Decade” (Asia, focusing on breakthroughs in “bottleneck” technologies), the United States’ “Return to Sea Control” initiative (North America, emphasizing the strengthening of maritime military power), Japan’s “Marine Energy and Mineral Resources Development Plan” (Asia, centered on deep-sea resource exploitation), the European Union’s “Blue Growth Strategy” (Europe, focusing on marine industrial innovation and upgrading), and the African Union’s “2050 Integrated Maritime Strategy” (Africa, prioritizing maritime governance and basic capacity building). These cases cover high-, middle-, and low-income countries across different regions, and encompass five major policy orientations—technological breakthrough, military security, resource development, industrial upgrading, and foundational governance—thereby reducing regional bias and providing differentiated references for latecomer countries.

2.2 Data sources

All data in this study are sourced from publicly available web-based platforms and authoritative institutional reports. The specific data sources are as follows: Data Sources for China’s “Ocean Decade” Program: National Marine Data and Information Service. (2024). China Ocean Development Foundation. (2024). Center for Ocean Development Studies, Ocean University of China. Geo-science Documentation Center, China Geological Survey. Data Sources for the U.S.: “Return to Sea Control” Strategy: U.S. Department of Defense. (2023). 2023 Fiscal Year Report. U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2024). Data Sources for Japan’s “Marine Energy and Mineral Resources Development Plan”: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan. (2024). Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC). (2024). Data Sources for the EU “Blue Growth Strategy”: European Commission. (2021). European Multidisciplinary Seafloor and Water Column Observatory (EMSO). (2023). European Wind Energy Association (EWEA). (2022). Data Sources for the AU “Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050”: AU Commission. (2022). AU Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD). (2023). World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). (2024). Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. (2023).

3 Analytical framework of the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities

Based on the aforementioned research methods and data support, this chapter focuses on the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities itself. It constructs a systematic analytical framework from three dimensions—conceptual connotations, key components, and basic characteristics—thereby laying the groundwork for subsequent theoretical interpretation and practical analysis.

3.1 Conceptual connotation

The embryonic form of the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities can be traced back to the mid-20th century, when countries launched a series of marine resource exploration and development programs to tap into the value of marine resources—such as the U.S. “Deep Sea Drilling Project (DSDP)” in the 1960s, followed by the “Ocean Drilling Program (ODP)” and the “Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP)”. The core objective was to improve the efficiency of marine resource utilization through technological innovation and support the sustainable development of the marine economy (Baker-Médard et al., 2021; Bax et al., 2021). Entering the twenty first century, with the intensification of worldwide local weather change, vitality shortages, marine air pollution, and different points, nations and worldwide organizations have begun to make use of such insurance policies to information marine technological innovation, addressing the twin challenges of useful resource improvement and environmental safety (Dutra et al., 2019). Its conceptual connotation could be analyzed based mostly on scope: the narrow-sense coverage focuses on single, clear, and short-term achievable objectives (Petek et al., 2022). A typical instance is China’s particular assist coverage for the event of the Fendouzhe (Striver) deep-sea manned submersible, which concentrated funding and analysis efforts on core applied sciences for a single piece of kit, enabling speedy breakthroughs in the important thing applied sciences for 10,000-meter deep-sea exploration. While the broad-sense coverage targets extra advanced, complete, and systematic societal challenges (Sewerin et al., 2020). For occasion, China’s “Ocean Decade” initiative covers a number of areas reminiscent of marine scientific and technological analysis, ecological safety, and the sustainable improvement of assets. It consists of not solely technological innovation duties reminiscent of deep-sea exploration and marine new vitality, but in addition software situations reminiscent of coastal air pollution management and fisheries useful resource conservation. By linking governments, analysis establishments, enterprises, the general public, and different numerous stakeholders, it kinds a cross-cutting, cross-regional collaborative promotion system that spans the whole chain of marine improvement, safety, and governance, distinguishing itself from the single-objective orientation of narrowly outlined insurance policies.

Based on this, this paper defines the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities as a broad-sense innovative policy paradigm addressing the “bottleneck” technology predicament in the marine sector faced by developing countries. Through systematic intervention, it aims to resolve urgent, difficult, dangerous, and arduous issues in marine science and technology, accelerating the pace of marine technological innovation.

3.2 Constituent elements

As a subfield of public policy, the concept of policy elements frequently appears in research on the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities (Bonvin and Laruffa, 2021). Drawing on current analysis on coverage components and integrating its distinctive connotations, this paper constructs a coverage ingredient evaluation framework encompassing 4 dimensions: marine coverage aims, marine coverage topics, marine coverage devices, and marine coverage processes (Figure 1).

Marine policy objectives are the goals and outcomes that governments aim to achieve when addressing marine-related issues, reflecting their vision and expectations (Arundel et al., 2019; Mavrot et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2025). Their setting is characterised by three key options: concentrating on, measurability, and time-boundness. Marine coverage actors seek advice from people, teams, or organizations that immediately or not directly take part in the whole technique of marine coverage and play essential roles (Morales et al., 2023). This coverage emphasizes giving full play to some great benefits of the brand new nationwide system to collaboratively tackle main marine challenges. Marine coverage devices seek advice from methods and strategies adopted by governments or related regulatory authorities to attain established marine coverage aims (Cejudo and Michel, 2021). This coverage employs a broader mixture of coverage devices, reminiscent of “leader recruitment for key projects” and “horse-racing mechanism”. The “leader recruitment for key projects” solicits high-caliber analysis groups from throughout society, clearly defines core technology breakthrough duties and consequence analysis standards, and focuses assets on overcoming particular person technical bottlenecks. For occasion, within the improvement of deep-sea manned submersibles, this mechanism has pushed the localization of key parts reminiscent of strain hulls and propulsion programs, breaking overseas technological monopolies. In distinction, the “horse-racing mechanism” concurrently deploys a number of analysis groups to sort out the identical essential technology route by way of aggressive R&D. By conducting real-time evaluations and dynamically adjusting useful resource allocation, it compels groups to speed up technological iteration, considerably shortening the time required to attain breakthroughs in areas reminiscent of marine new vitality and marine remark tools. The marine coverage course of is mostly understood as a dynamic mechanism of interplay amongst numerous marine-related topics within the technique of aim setting and achievement (Kuenzler and Stauffer, 2022). Its core hyperlinks embody the formulation, implementation, analysis, and adjustment of marine insurance policies.

3.3 Basic characteristics

After clarifying the constituent elements, comparing with traditional marine technological innovation policies further highlights the unique characteristics of the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities. By analyzing dimensions such as policy directional guidance, technological innovation leadership, subject collaboration models, and effectiveness evaluation mechanisms, this paper summarizes four prominent features of this policy compared to traditional marine technological innovation policies. These features collectively constitute its core advantages in addressing major marine challenges (Table 1).

4 Theoretical interpretation of the intervention of the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities

With the core framework of the policy clarified, it is necessary to further elaborate on the theoretical basis for its intervention in marine science, technology, and innovation activities. This chapter takes the transition failure theory as its core analytical lens to explain the legitimacy of policy intervention and to identify corresponding response pathways, thereby providing theoretical support for policy practice.

4.1 Basis for government intervention

Previous studies have argued that the rationale for government intervention in innovative activities primarily stems from market failure or system failure (Huang, 2023; Deng et al., 2020). As sustainable transition emerges as an rising theme in innovation analysis, the idea of “transition failure” has been proposed. The concept of transition failure posits that technological innovation is the driving drive behind profitable transitions, requiring focused strategic administration (Capasso et al., 2019). Leveraging this concept helps illuminate the dilemmas in technological improvement: by figuring out the foundation causes of failure and pinpointing the precise elements hindering technology diffusion, it offers particular objectives and motion instructions for the implementation of this coverage, whereas additionally providing a theoretical justification for the legitimacy of its intervention in marine technological innovation actions. It ought to be famous that the idea of transition failure, whereas offering a theoretical foundation for this coverage, additionally has sure limitations in sensible software. It ignores the interference of exterior elements reminiscent of geopolitics and worldwide governance system adjustments on the prevalence and answer of transition failure, which must be supplemented and improved in subsequent analysis.

4.2 Types of transition failure

The causes of transition failure in the marine sector can be further refined into four typical categories: directional failure, demand expression failure, policy cooperation failure, and reflexive failure (Blind and Niebel, 2022). First, directional failure happens when marine coverage makers lack continuity in coverage formulation, with shifting attitudes towards marine technology resulting in fluctuations in technological improvement. Second, demand expression failure manifests as a disconnect between the route of marine technological innovation and market wants, leading to low shopper acceptance of rising marine technological achievements. Third, coverage cooperation failure arises when totally different departments formulate insurance policies based mostly solely on their very own obligations, resulting in overlapping objectives and scattered coverage assets. Fourth, reflexive failure refers back to the absence of normal suggestions and correction mechanisms throughout coverage implementation, making it troublesome to advertise speedy coverage changes and leaving the full-cycle coverage administration with out dynamic evaluation and well timed revision mechanisms.

4.3 Addressing transition failure

The characteristics of the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities do not exist in isolation; instead, they form a systematic response logic precisely aligned with failure issues, providing actionable intervention pathways to overcome systemic barriers in marine technological innovation (Mao et al., 2025). Addressing transition failure requires adjusting particular pathways based mostly on the precise circumstances of various nations, particularly latecomer nations (LePoire, 2024). Four focused response methods are proposed, akin to the 4 forms of transition failure: First, to mitigate directional failure, governments ought to information the route of marine innovation based mostly on the pressing wants of nationwide marine improvement. Priority ought to be given to supporting marine technological innovation that addresses core home challenges (e.g., regional deep-sea useful resource exploration bottlenecks or coastal ecological safety gaps), guaranteeing continuity in innovation priorities and stabilizing the trajectory of marine technological development. Second, to resolve demand expression failure, the federal government’s main function in aligning innovation with market wants ought to be emphasised. Under authorities coordination, related entities (together with analysis establishments, enterprises, and end-users) ought to collaborate on key technology R&D, with a give attention to fixing “bottleneck” applied sciences which have clear market software worth. This collaboration ensures that modern outcomes are conscious of sensible calls for, thereby enhancing market acceptance of rising marine applied sciences. Third, to beat coverage cooperation failure, interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral, and interdepartmental collaboration mechanisms ought to be established. These mechanisms goal to combine the strengths of numerous innovation actors within the marine subject—reminiscent of universities, analysis institutes, enterprises, and authorities companies—fostering coordinated R&D on key core applied sciences. This integration addresses problems with overlapping coverage objectives and scattered assets, consolidating a unified “transformation coalition” for marine technological development. Fourth, to handle reflective failure, a complete, long-term marine coverage analysis framework ought to be developed, accompanied by the implementation of versatile and adaptive coverage measures. Regular analysis cycles, suggestions channels for frontline implementers, and dynamic adjustment mechanisms ought to be embedded into the complete coverage lifecycle, enabling well timed corrections to insurance policies and bettering their adaptability to evolving marine improvement wants.

4.4 Theoretical limitations

While the transition failure framework provides a core explanation for strengthening the intervention legitimacy of policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities, its application in the maritime domain exhibits significant limitations and struggles to fully capture the complexity of real-world situations. The theory primarily focuses on domestic technological transitions and institutional adaptation, yet it overlooks the inherently geopolitical nature of the marine sector. It fails to incorporate external factors such as the global competition for maritime hegemony, regional power dynamics, and the geoeconomic structures shaped by colonial histories (Lin and Sun, 2025). As a consequence, it can’t adequately clarify why some nations prioritize geopolitical competitors over short-term technological effectivity or ecological objectives. Moreover, the framework implicitly assumes that nations take part in technological transitions on an equal footing, which contradicts the truth of energy asymmetry in world marine science and technology. It doesn’t critically tackle how early-mover nations set up technological dominance by way of rule-making, patent monopolies, and different mechanisms, nor does it account for cross-scale curiosity conflicts, technological moral disputes, and different multidimensional points. Consequently, the coverage pathways it proposes typically wrestle to beat exterior energy obstacles and advanced worth conflicts, limiting its skill to supply a complete clarification of worldwide strategic marine science and technology insurance policies.

5 Policy practice of strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities

While the transition failure theory provides the theoretical logic for policy operation, practical cases from countries around the world can further verify the framework’s applicability. This chapter draws on five typical cases to analyze, from a practical perspective, the policy characteristics and implementation patterns of countries at different stages of development.

Due to differences in historical backgrounds, political systems, and economic conditions, policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities have exhibited distinct characteristics across countries and over time (Nguyen, 2024; Li et al., 2024; Lynam et al., 2016). Global mission-oriented innovation initiatives within the marine area reveal that this coverage at present think about 5 key areas: overcoming marine “bottleneck” applied sciences, enhancing maritime navy capabilities, addressing the challenges of deep-sea useful resource improvement, selling the innovation and upgrading of the marine trade, and bettering maritime governance and safety. Enhancing maritime navy capabilities serves as a elementary prerequisite for safeguarding nationwide maritime rights and pursuits. Faced with a posh and unstable maritime geopolitical panorama, nations usually place maritime safety on the core of their nationwide methods, concentrating high-quality assets to sort out essential bottlenecks in naval improvement and maritime protection programs. Within the context of intensifying world competitors in deep-sea useful resource improvement, many countries are pushed by a powerful sense of mission to slender the technological hole with main maritime useful resource powers. With the strategic aim of accelerating their catch-up with superior maritime economies, these nations are striving to improve their deep-sea useful resource improvement applied sciences from a “following” to a “leapfrogging” trajectory. At the identical time, selling the innovation and upgrading of the marine trade and bettering maritime governance and safety have develop into essential avenues for nations to reinforce their total competitiveness within the marine sector and obtain sustainable ocean improvement.

These 5 forms of coverage practices mirror the variations in useful resource endowments and urgent challenges confronted by nations at totally different phases of improvement and in various contexts, which in flip result in heterogeneity of their dominant strategic duties. Against this backdrop, this text selects 5 main circumstances—China’s “Ocean Decade” initiative, the United States’ “Return to Sea Control” technique, Japan’s “Marine Energy and Mineral Resources Development Plan,” the European Union’s “Blue Growth Strategy,” and the African Union’s “2050 Integrated Maritime Strategy”—to discover in depth the 5 typical modern coverage (Table 2).

5.1 Policy practice focused on addressing marine “bottleneck” technology blockades

In recent years, while the global level of technological innovation has advanced rapidly, the demand for core technologies to support marine development and resource security has grown increasingly urgent (Cormier et al., 2022). Against this backdrop, coverage practices centered on addressing marine “bottleneck” applied sciences have step by step emerged.

In 2021, the United Nations launched the “Ocean Decade” initiative. China responded actively to this international call, participating in global marine technological innovation while aligning its efforts with the goal of building a strong maritime nation. Focusing on key bottlenecks in marine core technologies, China has developed a distinctive set of policies for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities. In terms of policy objectives, China’s core goal is not only to participate in global marine innovation but, more importantly, to carry out research on key marine core technologies and to deeply integrate independently developed breakthroughs in marine “bottleneck” technologies into the global framework for sustainable ocean development.

In terms of policy actors, central government departments are responsible for top-level design and resource coordination, while marine research institutions lead technological research. Leading marine enterprises undertake industrialization tasks, and marine universities provide talent and basic research support.

Regarding policy instruments, China has innovatively adopted research organization models such as “challenge-based bidding” and “horse-race mechanisms.” It has released public lists of key research tasks—for example, in the development of deep-sea manned submersibles—and provided long-term funding for critical technology R&D. Collaborative platforms integrating “industry, academia, research, and application” have also been established.

In terms of policy processes, China employs a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Central authorities decompose overall goals and clarify responsibilities, while institutions such as the National Marine Data and Information Service track progress and monitor indicators. At the same time, grassroots research teams and marine enterprises provide bottom-up feedback on practical challenges and market needs. Every year, expert evaluations are conducted to adjust resource allocation and research priorities, forming a closed-loop management system.

Data show that between 2021 and 2023, China’s total R&D investment in the marine field reached 156 billion yuan, with more than 60% directed toward “bottleneck” technologies such as deep-sea equipment. China’s share of global patents related to deep-sea exploration technology exceeds 25%, placing it among the world leaders.

Overall, these practices have driven achievements such as the “Fendouzhe” (Striver) deep-sea submersible to reach internationally advanced levels, contributing a Chinese approach to global marine science and technology development. They also offer valuable references for latecomer countries seeking to overcome technological bottlenecks and formulate technology-focused policies tailored to their own national contexts.

5.2 Policy practice targeting the strengthening of maritime military power

​ The deployment of maritime military capabilities serves as a fundamental means for maritime powers to secure marine interests, while also acting as a core guarantee for safeguarding national maritime security and upholding maritime rights (Tai and Qiu, 2024).

In January 2017, the U.S. Navy put forward the “Return to Sea Control” strategy and released the document Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control, which stands as a consultant case of insurance policies concentrating on the strengthening maritime energy and guaranteeing world maritime dominance. Led by the U.S. Department of the Navy, the initiative goals to handle challenges posed by rising maritime powers and to safe America’s absolute benefit in world waters.

In terms of policy objectives, the core goals of the U.S. Navy’s Return to Sea Control initiative extend beyond enhancing traditional maritime combat capabilities. They also include advancing the modernization of naval technology and strengthening control over key maritime areas, thereby supporting U.S. leadership in the global economy, technology, and diplomacy.

In terms of policy actors, the U.S. Department of the Navy is responsible for overall planning and implementation, and a dedicated office was established to coordinate and oversee the strategy. Additional participants include various naval warfare commands, the Naval Research Laboratory, defense contractors, and inter-service cooperation units.

Regarding policy instruments, the initiative relies on substantial defense budgets and government procurement. The U.S. Congress has passed a series of appropriation acts, providing ample financial support for naval vessel construction, technological R&D, and personnel training.

In terms of policy processes, the U.S. Department of the Navy adopts a top-down management model, using centralized planning to ensure the consistency of strategic objectives while allowing each operational unit sufficient autonomy through hierarchical organization. During project implementation, the Department of the Navy has established a rigorous accountability mechanism. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) regularly evaluates phased outcomes, and resource allocation and strategic priorities are dynamically adjusted based on these assessments.

According to available data, between 2017 and 2023, U.S. Navy investment in maritime military technology R&D reached a cumulative total of 128 billion U.S. dollars, with annual growth of 15% in core technology areas such as unmanned combat systems and advanced ship propulsion. Patent applications related to unmanned vessels and maritime communication technologies reached 1,890, accounting for 31% of the global total, and the intensity of U.S. military presence in key maritime areas has increased significantly.

These practices demonstrate that by concentrating resources to advance naval technological modernization and enhance operational capabilities, the United States has developed a model that offers insights for global maritime security policy-making. In particular, it provides valuable lessons for latecomer countries with maritime security needs, helping them to integrate military and technological resources and to establish efficient policy implementation and evaluation mechanisms.

5.3 Policy practice oriented toward tackling deep-sea resource development challenges

Deep-sea resource development is not only a critical pathway to overcoming resource constraints but also a strategic opportunity for developing countries to catch up in marine science, technology, and industry (Marlow et al., 2022).

Against the backdrop of intensifying global competition in marine resource exploitation, Japan—a pioneer in this field—has launched its Marine Energy and Mineral Resources Development Plan, which is explicitly designed to handle the challenges of deep-sea useful resource improvement. This plan, pushed by the brand new spherical of technological revolution, is a significant nationwide technique and a consultant case of insurance policies aimed toward industrial catch-up and technological innovation.

In terms of policy objectives, Japan’s overall goal is to achieve parity or even surpass international leaders in deep-sea resource development, while also setting quantifiable, time-bound milestones. The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI)’s Marine Energy and Mineral Resources Development Plan (2020–2035) stipulates that by 2030, Japan’s deep-sea useful resource improvement applied sciences ought to attain an internationally superior degree, and industrial exploitation of deep-sea mineral assets ought to be realized.

In terms of policy actors, METI and the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC) are responsible for formulating and organizing the plan, while the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) serves as the primary implementing body.

Regarding policy instruments, Japan has established several interministerial coordination mechanisms, such as the Liaison Conference for the Promotion of Ocean Science and Technology Development, which is chaired by the Chief Cabinet Secretary and consists of officers from 14 ministries. This construction ensures complete coordination and facilitates the development of marine improvement applied sciences.

In terms of policy processes, Japan’s deep-sea resource development plan exhibits a strong top-down character. The central government acts as the core decision-maker, guiding the formulation and implementation of the strategy. At the same time, local governments, enterprises, research institutions, and universities have actively responded to central government initiatives, gradually becoming important participants in deep-sea resource development and contributing to practical applications and research in this field.

Relevant data show that between 2020 and 2023, Japan’s cumulative R&D investment in deep-sea resource development reached 2.3 trillion yen, accounting for 41% of total investment in the marine industry. More than 80% of this funding was allocated to key technologies such as deep-sea rare earth exploration and methane hydrate extraction. Japan filed 860 patents related to deep-sea mineral exploration technologies and expects to achieve commercial exploitation by 2030, with an annual production capacity of 12,000 tons—sufficient to meet 30% of Japan’s domestic rare earth demand.

For developing countries, deep-sea resource development needs to be promoted in a phased manner that aligns with their own resource endowments and technological capabilities. This approach can turn deep-sea development into a strategic window for overcoming resource constraints and achieving catch-up in marine science, technology, and industry, while avoiding inefficient or wasteful investment.

5.4 Policy practices centered on promoting the innovation and upgrading of the marine industry

Against the backdrop of global low-carbon transitions and industrial upgrading, the marine industry—with its dual economic potential and ecological value—has become a key focus for countries seeking to foster new growth engines. As a result, policy practices centered on promoting the innovation and upgrading of the marine industry have gradually taken shape (Sun et al., 2024).

The European Union launched its “Blue Growth Strategy” in 2012, which was further upgraded in 2021 in alignment with the European Green Deal. This has formed a policy framework for marine industry development driven by innovation and low-carbon transition, making it a representative case of how developed economies promote the coordinated upgrading of their marine sectors. In terms of policy objectives, the core aim is to unlock the potential of the blue economy, advance emerging industries such as marine renewable energy and marine biotechnology, and achieve synergies between economic growth and ecological protection.

In terms of policy actors, the European Commission takes the lead in top-level design and goal coordination, while member states are responsible for implementing policies tailored to their specific maritime advantages. Specialized bodies such as the European Multidisciplinary Seafloor and Water-column Observatory (EMSO) and the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) provide technical support. Meanwhile, multinational enterprises including Siemens Gamesa and research institutions such as the Netherlands Institute for Sea Research (NIOZ) participate in technology development and technology transfer, forming a multi-actor collaborative network.

Regarding policy instruments, the EU leverages funding from the Horizon Europe program to provide dedicated financial support, uses carbon pricing mechanisms to guide low-carbon industrial transitions, and offers green patent incentives to encourage technological innovation. It has also established cross-border research platforms such as Euro Sea to facilitate resource sharing and collaborative research.

In terms of policy processes, the EU adopts a dual synergy model of “EU-level coordination + national-level implementation.” The EU formulates unified technical standards, ecological conservation red lines, and industrial development guidelines, while member states develop differentiated implementation rules based on the resource endowments of regions such as the North Sea and the Mediterranean. Every three years, the European Commission publishes a “Blue Economy Progress Report” to conduct dynamic evaluations and adjust resource allocation and policy priorities accordingly.

Relevant data show that between 2012 and 2023, the EU invested more than 35 billion euros in marine research and development, with 75% allocated to emerging fields such as marine renewable energy and marine biotechnology. From 2018 to 2023, the EU filed 1,243 patents in marine biotechnology, accounting for 31% of the global total, and its share of global offshore wind power technology patents exceeded 40%. In 2022, the EU’s blue economy added value reached 860 billion euros, with contributions from emerging marine industries increasing by 180% compared to 2012, and cumulative carbon emissions reductions reaching 120 million tons.

These practices demonstrate that through the dual drivers of technological and institutional innovation, the EU has developed a model that supports the high-quality development of the global marine industry. In particular, it offers valuable lessons for latecomer countries with a certain industrial foundation, helping them to cultivate emerging marine industries while balancing economic development and ecological protection.

5.5 Policy practices oriented toward improving maritime governance and protection

For regions rich in marine resources but constrained by weak governance capacity, strengthening maritime governance and protection, as well as enhancing regional coordination, has become a key approach to addressing maritime security threats and ecological crises.

The African Union (AU) adopted its “2050 Integrated Maritime Strategy” in 2014 and revised it in 2022, focusing on regional maritime security, ecological protection, and governance capacity building. This makes it a representative case of how low-income countries can improve maritime governance through regional collaboration. In terms of policy objectives, the core aim is to tackle the multiple challenges of maritime security, resource exploitation, and ecological protection through coordinated regional action.

In terms of policy actors, the AU Commission takes the lead in designing the overall framework, while the AU Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) is responsible for cross-regional coordination. National maritime and fisheries authorities of member states implement policies at the country level, and international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) provide financial, technical, and training support. Together, they form a top-down “regional–national–international” governance system.

Regarding policy instruments, the AU has established regional marine research funds to support the development of practical technologies. It has also built technology transfer platforms in cooperation with the EU and China to provide training in marine observation, ecological restoration, and other key areas.

In terms of policy processes, the AU formulates unified regional rules for maritime governance, frameworks for security cooperation, and standards for ecological protection. Member states then develop specific implementation plans based on their own marine resources and governance capacities, and leverage international funding and technical support to address capacity gaps. Every five years, a regional assessment of maritime governance capacity is conducted to optimize policy implementation pathways.

These policies have achieved notable results. Between 2014 and 2023, Africa’s cumulative investment in marine research and development reached approximately 4.5 billion euros, 60% of which came from international assistance. Eighty percent of this funding was allocated to practical technology areas such as coastal observation, sustainable fisheries development, and ecological restoration. From 2018 to 2023, Africa filed 187 patents in the marine field, mainly in practical domains such as fisheries technology and coastal observation equipment, with a patent conversion rate of 42%.

Such practices demonstrate how regional coordination and international cooperation can help address governance deficits. They provide valuable lessons for latecomer regions seeking to improve maritime governance and protection, particularly resource-rich but governance-weak regions such as Africa and Southeast Asia, offering insights into balancing resource development, security, and ecological conservation.

6 Conclusions and implications

6.1 Research conclusions

• 1. The policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities is an innovative policy paradigm addressing the “bottleneck” technology predicament in the marine sector faced by latecomer countries. Through systematic policy intervention, it aims to resolve urgent, difficult, dangerous, and arduous issues in marine science and technology. From the perspective of objectives, it can be divided into a narrow category focusing on single goals and a broad category addressing complex social challenges. The four constituent elements and four key characteristics collectively form its core framework, distinguishing it from traditional policies.

• 2. In response to the four types of transition failure in the marine sector—directional failure, demand expression failure, policy cooperation failure, and reflexive failure—the policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities can correct deviations in innovation direction through directional guidance, guide market demand through technological innovation, break down barriers to inter-entity collaboration through collaborative participation, and improve policy optimization mechanisms through dynamic evaluation, forming a closed-loop logic of “failure identification – policy intervention – problem resolution.”

• 3. Current global policy practices for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities are primarily concentrated in five areas: breakthroughs in “bottleneck” technologies, enhancement of maritime military capabilities, deep-sea resource development, innovation and upgrading of the marine industry, and foundational maritime governance and capacity building. These five types of practices exhibit a clear pattern of “development-stage alignment”: high-income regions tend to focus on “innovation upgrading + hegemony maintenance,” characterized by high R&D investment intensity and dense patent outputs. In contrast, middle- and low-income regions prioritize “basic capacity building + security assurance,” with R&D funding relying more on domestic coordination or international support, and patenting activity concentrated in such practical fields as marine fisheries, coastal observation, and ecological governance.

6.2 Policy implications

• 1. To strengthen policy implementation and the advancement of pilot projects in latecomer countries, it is essential for these nations to build on their own resource endowments and adopt a principle of “pilot first, small-scale investment, and rapid iteration,” so as to translate policies into concrete, testable initiatives. Drawing on China’s experience with the “new nationwide system,” latecomer countries could establish interministerial coordinating bodies for strategic marine science and technology, and prioritize pilot programs in livelihood-related areas such as coastal ecological protection and low-cost marine observation. For example, Southeast Asian countries could launch a “coastal eco-fisheries technology pilot,” collaborating with local research institutions and fishing cooperatives to develop low-impact fishing equipment suitable for small-scale vessels. Governments could provide a 30% R&D subsidy plus preferential procurement support, with an 18-month pilot period, and use “stable fishery yields + a 10% increase in coastal coral reef survival rates” as core evaluation metrics. In Africa, countries could leverage the AU’s regional marine research fund to jointly implement an “East African coastal disaster early-warning technology pilot,” integrating international technology transfer platforms. The goal would be to achieve a storm warning accuracy rate of over 80% within two years, covering five coastal nations. At the same time, it is important to systematically document the experiences gained from these pilots—including stakeholder coordination and funding ratios—and develop simple, practical handbooks that can serve as replicable references for other countries, thereby avoiding inefficient or blind investment.

• 2. To build a sustainable development policy framework tailored to developing countries, it is necessary to embed ecological ethical constraints into the entire policy process and establish an action framework that is “quantifiable in objectives, monitorable in processes, and assessable in outcomes.” In terms of directional guidance, policies should focus on core needs such as the sustainable use of coastal resources and marine disaster prevention, while setting phased targets—for instance, achieving 50% localization of coastal pollution monitoring technologies and an 8% annual increase in the area of marine ecological restoration by 2030. In terms of technological innovation, tax incentives and special subsidies can be used to foster green marine industries, with enterprises engaged in marine carbon sinks and low−pollution development technologies eligible for preferential policies such as a “two−year exemption and three−year halving” of corporate income tax. In terms of collaborative participation, a multi−stakeholder mechanism involving governments, research institutions, local enterprises, and international organizations should be established. Cooperation with bodies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) can support ecological protection training programs that reach 100 policymakers and technical personnel annually. In terms of dynamic assessment, a three−dimensional evaluation system—covering technology adoption rates, marine economic contribution rates, and biodiversity conservation outcomes—should be constructed, with policy adjustments conducted every two years to ensure that development and protection proceed in a mutually reinforcing manner.

• 3. To establish a classified policy toolbox and an ethical risk prevention mechanism, it is necessary to match composite tool combinations of “technological breakthrough + ecological protection + ethical constraints” to different policy objectives. When addressing “bottleneck” technologies, countries can draw on China’s “challenge-based bidding” model by setting up special funds with attached ecological clauses. For example, South American countries could jointly launch a “deep-sea mineral exploration technology initiative” that mandates the use of non-explosive sampling techniques and avoids ecologically sensitive deep-sea areas, adopting a dual standard of “technological breakthrough + zero ecological damage.” When enhancing maritime security capabilities, countries can learn from the U.S. approach of civil-military coordination to promote the transfer of civilian technologies to security applications, but they should also establish ethical review mechanisms to prohibit their use for predatory resource monitoring. When developing deep-sea resources, an “ecological restoration bond” system can be introduced, requiring enterprises to pre-pay a bond equivalent to 10% of the total project investment. If mining activities cause benthic organism survival rates to drop below 70%, the bond would be deducted to fund ecological restoration. In addition, environmental monitoring data should be publicly disclosed quarterly and subject to international third-party audits to balance the need for resource development with biodiversity conservation.

6.3 Research limitations

Although this study has constructed an analytical framework for policy for strengthening marine strategic science and technology capabilities and has conducted case and theoretical analyses, it still has several limitations that leave room for future expansion. First, while the case selection covers multiple regions and development stages, it remains insufficiently representative of policy practices in South America, Oceania, and other regions. Future research could expand the scope of cases to enhance the global applicability of the findings. Second, the quantitative analysis focuses primarily on explicit indicators such as R&D investment and patent counts, and does not adequately measure the long-term social and ecological benefits of policies. Subsequent studies could develop a more comprehensive, multidimensional indicator system to deepen quantitative research in this area. Third, the theoretical framework relies mainly on the transition failure perspective and does not sufficiently integrate interdisciplinary insights from geopolitics, power structures, and other fields. Future work could incorporate multiple theoretical lenses to enrich the interpretation of strategic marine science and technology policies. Finally, this study focuses on existing policies and practices, and offers limited discussion of policy evolution driven by technological change and adjustments in international rules. Future research could adopt a more forward-looking approach by analyzing the implications of emerging technologies for marine strategic science and technology governance.

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