The collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore may very well be repeated throughout the nation if suggestions aren’t adopted, the National Transportation Safety Board mentioned Tuesday.
The board issued 17 security suggestions this week to prevent an accident like the one final yr, the place the 213-million-pound cargo vessel Dali misplaced engine and electrical energy because it was leaving the port and struck a pillar of the Key Bridge inflicting it to collapse.
The NTSB really useful Synergy Marine, the ship’s operator, use thermal imaging to discover lose wires on its different vessels, be certain that the proper pumps are getting used, and that engines received’t mechanically shut down in conditions like this crash.
Other suggestions embody new guidelines for wire labeling, a warning system for drivers crossing bridges in case of emergency, and higher recoding programs to seize information on ships in case of a crash.
“In order to see safety change, we need our recommendations implemented,” NTSB chairwoman Jennifer Homendy advised reporters after a virtually 5 hour public assembly. “That’s the next step. We’ve issued the safety recommendations now we need to make sure that they’re implemented, and so we will work diligently.”

The NTSB held the public assembly Tuesday to decide the possible explanation for the container ship Dali crashing into the Francis Scott Key Bridge, and its subsequent collapse, killing six individuals.
The 984-feet lengthy vessel operated in the container liner commerce, carrying truck-sized bins of cargo between Asia and the US East Coast. The bridge was owned and operated by the Maryland Transportation Authority and opened to site visitors on March 23, 1977.
The final time the bridge was inspected was in 2024 when it was given a passable score. Yet the Key Bridge had almost 30 occasions the acceptable stage of threat for essential bridges of collapse if it had been hit, primarily based on steering established by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, the NTSB mentioned. But nobody knew that earlier than the collapse, as a result of the proprietor of the bridge, the Maryland Transportation Authority, by no means evaluated that threat.
The company says all of the blame for the bridge collapse is the fault of the ship.
“The MDTA maintains that the collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge and the tragic loss of life were the sole fault of the DALI and the gross negligence of its owners and operators,” it mentioned in an announcement to NCS Tuesday. “The Key Bridge was approved and permitted by the federal government and complied with those permits.”
In an announcement, Synergy thanked the NTSB for its “professionalism and technical rigour” all through this investigation and mentioned it and Grace Ocean Investment Limited, the firm that owns the ship, have cooperated absolutely with the board.
“We note the Board’s findings, including its observations regarding the vulnerability of the Key Bridge’s main support pier, as well as the comments relating to aspects of the vessel’s electrical arrangements. These matters will be reviewed in detail with our technical teams, the vessel owner and counsel,” the assertion mentioned.
Earlier this yr, the NTSB really useful threat assessments even be carried out on 68 different bridges in 19 states spanning waterways frequented by cargo ships that, like the Key Bridge, had been constructed earlier than 1991 and should not have a present vulnerability evaluation.
Among these on the checklist are the Golden Gate Bridge in California; Brooklyn, Manhattan, Williamsburg, George Washington and Verrazzano-Narrows bridges in New York City; the Walt Whitman and Benjamin Franklin bridges in Pennsylvania; the Sunshine Skyway in Florida and the Mackinac Bridge in Michigan.
On Tuesday, Homendy famous that regardless of its suggestions, a few of these bridges nonetheless haven’t been evaluated for threat of collapse if a ship like the Dali had been to hit them.
One unfastened wire, amongst 1000’s
The NTSB mentioned Tuesday it believes the possible explanation for the energy outage that led to the crash was a label was put in the fallacious place on a sign wire when the ship was constructed. That sticker, figuring out the line, stored the wire from getting a superb connection in a circuit breaker – which in flip in the end prompted the first blackout.

As a end result, in accordance to Marcel Muse, the NTSB’s investigator in cost, the vessel misplaced steering, the capacity to function the bow thruster, key water pumps, and most of the vessel’s lighting and tools important for operations. That first outage lasted 58 seconds.
There had been 1000’s of wires on the Dali, and one unfastened wire wouldn’t have been simply discovered by the crew.
“The Dali is almost 1,000 feet, and it’s as long as the Eiffel Tower,” Homendy mentioned. “It’s high with miles of wiring and thousands of electrical connections. Locating a single wire that is loose among thousands of wires is like looking for a loose bolt in the Eiffel Tower.”
The crew onboard the Dali shortly discovered the tripped breaker, the NTSB mentioned. Power got here again inside 58 seconds, however restarting a key pump that might have supplied gasoline to turbines had to be performed manually, and that didn’t occur. When the turbines ran out of fuel of their traces, the end result was a second blackout.
“To restart it, you would have to go two levels down in near total darkness with a flashlight from the engine control deck to the purifier room on the fourth deck,” Homendy mentioned.
The pump the Dali was utilizing was designed for upkeep and was not meant to be used whereas the ship was underway, so there was no backup system.
At the time of the second blackout, the Dali was simply three ships’ lengths from the bridge and regardless of the pilots reacting correctly, they couldn’t regain management in time to keep away from hitting it, the NTSB mentioned.
About 10 hours earlier, whereas the ship was nonetheless moored, it skilled two onboard blackouts, one brought on by a crew error, in accordance to the NTSB.
Last yr, Grace Ocean and Synergy reached a settlement with the Justice Department to pay almost $102 million to resolve a civil declare alleging that the corporations’ cost-cutting and negligence in the ship’s upkeep led to the disastrous collision.
In its submitting final month, the Justice Department mentioned that the “tragedy was entirely avoidable,” pointing to alleged failures in the ship’s infrastructure.
Investigators additionally encountered many points extracting data from the vessel’s recorders, that are comparable to black bins on airplanes.
Voyage information recorders, often known as a VDRs, are digital programs that constantly report navigational and placement information, radar photos, primary engine operations, alarm standing, bridge audio recordings and VHF radio communications, in accordance to the NTSB.
Sean Payne, an investigator in the NTSB’s car recorder division, mentioned throughout the investigation, the NTSB encountered a number of issues that made it laborious to extract and use the information effectively.
“Key issues included unrecorded data during the vessel’s first underway blackout, the lack of recording of communications between the Dali’s bridge and the Dali’s engine room, the digitally destructive mixing of recorded bridge audio channels, inadequate VDR playback software, the inability to download the full data set on board the Dali, and the complex workflow for processing proprietary VDR data in the common formats,” he defined.
The remaining report on the incident shall be revised and issued in a number of weeks and the 17 suggestions shall be formally issued and finalized by the NTSB.
“We have a really big voice, and we’re not afraid to use it,” Homendy mentioned. “While we don’t have enforcement power, certainly, we have had a lot of success with voluntary adoption of our recommendations. We’re usually at an 83% closure rate.”
NCS’s Michelle Watson contributed to this report.