As US particular forces have been within the last phases of planning a daring nighttime operation into the center of the Venezuelan capital, President Nicolás Maduro was posing for pictures with China’s prime envoy to Latin America and lavishing reward on Beijing’s management.
“I thank President Xi Jinping for his continued brotherhood, like an older brother,” Maduro instructed Chinese diplomat Qiu Xiaoqi, as laughter echoed via the alternate on the Miraflores Palace in Caracas.
Hours later, Maduro was snatched from his bed room by elite Delta Force commandos from the US Army and China was staring on the stark actuality it had simply misplaced certainly one of its staunchest companions in Latin America.
China and Venezuela have maintained shut relations for many years, solid by a shared political ideology and mutual mistrust of a world led by the United States.
Through an “all-weather strategic partnership” established in 2023, Beijing pulled Caracas additional into its orbit with deepened financial support and diplomatic assist.
The bulk of Venezuelan oil exports stream to China, and Chinese firms finance in depth infrastructure initiatives and investments throughout the nation, with Beijing lending billions to Caracas in current many years.
Trump’s transfer has appeared to upend that relationship, not less than for now, elevating questions over China’s preferential entry to Venezuelan oil and the way forward for its political and financial affect within the wider area.
Beijing has been fast to denounce Maduro’s seize, condemning Washington for behaving just like the world’s policeman. Chinese social media has additionally erupted with pleasure and dialogue concerning the US’ actions.
By late Monday, matters linked to Trump’s seize of Maduro had acquired greater than 650 million impressions on Weibo, China’s X-like social media platform, with many customers suggesting it might provide a template for Beijing’s personal potential army takeover of Taiwan.
If the US can snatch a chief of their yard, many ask, why can’t China do the identical?
China’s ruling Communist Party claims the self-governing democracy as its territory, regardless of by no means having managed it, and has vowed to soak up the island, by power if obligatory. In current years Beijing has ramped up its army intimidation of Taiwan, together with by simulating blockades.
But whereas the prospect of capturing Taiwan’s chief could have stoked nationalist fever on-line, formally Beijing has adopted a markedly totally different tone, portraying the US raid as a “hegemonic act” whereas calling for the speedy launch of Maduro and his spouse.
On Monday, Xi took a additional veiled swipe at Washington when he condemned “unilateral bullying” that “seriously undermines the international order” throughout a assembly with the visiting Irish prime minister.
“All countries should respect other peoples’ independent choice of development paths and abide by international law and the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter – with major powers in particular setting the example,” he mentioned.
State-run media has wasted little time seizing on the incident to focus on what it described as US hypocrisy: “The US invasion has made it increasingly clear to everyone that what the United States calls a ‘rules-based international order’ is in reality nothing more than a plunder-based order driven by US interests,” a commentary by state-run Xinhua information company wrote.
A social media account linked to the People’s Liberation Army targeted extra on China’s energy and safety, warning that weak army capabilities might invite crises.
“Without hardened, core capabilities, it is impossible to deter predatory great powers – let alone protect the people’s safety when a crisis strikes suddenly,” it wrote.
Yet Beijing’s rhetoric on sovereignty has been notably absent in different conflicts.
When Russia, one other strategic associate, invaded Ukraine in 2022, China stopped in need of condemning Moscow or opposing the battle, as a substitute parroting Russian narrative of blaming on the United States and its NATO allies for frightening the battle.
China has emerged as the most important purchaser of Venezuelan crude in recent times after Trump imposed sanctions towards the South American nation in 2019. In the previous few months of 2025, as a lot as 80% of its exports possible went to China, in line with a market replace revealed by knowledge analytics agency Kpler final month.
Oil traders and analysts, nonetheless, imagine US actions towards Venezuela are unlikely to have a main influence on China’s oil provide, given Venezuela’s comparatively modest output and the function of non-state consumers.
Under the governments of Maduro and his predecessor Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s crude output has fallen by two-thirds from its peak, dropping to round a million barrels per day – a stage starkly at odds with its standing as the holder of the world’s largest confirmed oil reserves.
Most of Chinese importers of Venezuelan crude are additionally small, unbiased refiners, recognized as teapots, that are drawn to the oil largely due to its steep reductions.
Trump has prompt that China might proceed shopping for some Venezuelan crude, but at diminished volumes. The association underneath Trump would possible finish the deep reductions which have made the oil enticing to teapots.
Beyond power, Beijing has additionally hailed Venezuela as an “important trading partner and investment destination for China in Latin America.”
In the last decade since 2007, China lent Venezuela $62.5 billion, almost half of all Chinese lending to South America for the interval, making the nation the only largest recipient of Chinese finance worldwide, in line with research by Washington-based Stimson Center.
As speak now inevitably turns as to whether the US attack on Venezuela might embolden China, in Taiwan many are shrugging off such threats.
Wang Ting-yu, a lawmaker from Taiwan’s ruling social gathering who sits on the legislature’s overseas affairs and protection committee, rejected the concept China would possibly observe the US precedent and attack the island.
“China is the not the US, and Taiwan is not Venezuela. Comparisons that China can carry out the same thing in Taiwan is wrong and inappropriate,” Wang mentioned, including that “China has never been short of hostility towards Taiwan militarily; what it lacks is feasible means.”
Although China’s Xi has lengthy described “reunification” with Taiwan as inevitable, specialists say Beijing will proceed to tread cautiously.
William Yang, senior analyst at Belgium-based suppose tank International Crisis Group, mentioned the US transfer towards Venezuela is unlikely to have “any direct and fundamental impact” on China’s calculation over a potential invasion of Taiwan.
Instead, Yang mentioned the components figuring out Beijing’s timeline to take over Taiwan boil right down to China’s home financial state of affairs, the People’s Liberation Army’s capabilities, Taiwan’s home political state of affairs, as effectively as Washington’s coverage towards Taiwan and China.
But Washington’s actions create a new regular, he warned.
“The takeaway for Taiwan is that resorting to military options to pursue certain foreign policy goals is likely going to become a new norm and new reality around the world,” Yang instructed NCS. “Taiwan should really take this by heart and start to think about how to improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities and improve Taiwan’s ability to maintain deterrence against China.”
And additional afield in Latin America, questions stay over the way forward for China’s longer-term technique in what Washington has historically considered as its “backyard.”
Dan Wang, China director at political threat consultancy Eurasia Group, mentioned though the ousting of Maduro represented a “major setback” for Beijing’s broader strategic affect within the area, it might proceed to leverage its funding in South America, particularly in energy provide and telecommunication – the place any effort to take away Chinese firms from essential infrastructure initiatives might result in social instability.
Yang echoed the sentiment, saying that Beijing is extra prone to prioritize minimizing the fallout on its financial pursuits – somewhat than participating in an all-out geopolitical competitors with the US within the area.